Talking business With Rebels

How social and political conflict is affecting business and governance in Nagaland and surrounding areas

By Sudeep Chakravarti

You wish to tap petroleum? Natural gas? Check with the rebels or check out. In July, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), or NSCN (I-M), the largest rebel group in Nagaland and a large swathe of adjacent Manipur, nixed an exploration project in Nagaland.

The group’s civilian arm, the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim, through its ministry of mines and minerals wrote to Metropolitan Oil and Gas Pvt. Ltd, rejecting the firm’s prospecting licence. The permit was issued by the government of Nagaland. Work stopped. Three months earlier, the outfit had with a similar diktat disrupted oil exploration by Jubilant Energy NV in western Manipur.

This claim is based on operational heft as well as a pitch for a future Nagalim, or greater Nagaland that seeks to unite Naga homelands in contiguous areas of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

And, at an unlikely stretch in Myanmar. Several strands of history and politics, and ambition and suspicion are intertwined with a tense present and an uncertain future.

Matters will get more complicated. Metropolitan Oil is at the centre of a controversy in Nagaland. Documents circulated to policymakers and media (I have a set) question antecedents and credibility of the company’s promoters and accuse them of making false claims of expertise and solvency. Local media have speculated about the proximity of politicians of the Zeliang tribe to Metropolitan Oil.

The Zeliang Naga tribal region to Nagaland’s southwest is a key exploration area. NSCN (I-M)’s July censure is based on such allegations. There’s more to the stew than business deals. After all, competition ensures sniping. One company can theoretically be replaced by another. And politicians are proven to be industrious in demanding a mile of personal benefit where even an inch is illegal. It also goes beyond constitutionally mandated rights in Nagaland (which became a state in 1963) that permits the state primacy in mineral rights. The right extends to ownership of land by a particular tribe—individually and in community trust.

And, therefore, the extent of negotiable benefits that would accrue from mineral exploration. This provided activists of the Lotha Naga tribe the leverage to prevent exploration and extraction of oil by Oil and Natural Gas Corp. Ltd in the Wokha area of Nagaland. It’s a stunning reality that a rebel group in ceasefire with the government of India since 1997 runs a parallel administration—and a parallel economy—in its areas of operation.

This is also true of NSCN (I-M)’s bitter—and relatively weaker—rivals of the Khaplang faction, known as NSCN (K), which inked a ceasefire agreement in 2001. The chaplee, or finance ministries of both groups freely extract taxes from individuals—even politicians and bureaucrats—and businesses. In July, Nagaland-based newspapers carried an NSCN (K) announcement, that an “official with the following phone numbers has been appointed to oversee financial affairs pertaining to the Southern Zone—9862567272, 9436111777”. Reality is as twisted in Manipur.

The ceasefire agreements with Naga groups do not extend to Manipur, even though Naga homelands like that of the Tangkhul and Zeliangrong tribes, among others, are in present-day Manipur (the former kingdom was accorded statehood in 1972). This is on account of huge protests in non-tribal areas of Manipur.

Protesters perceived a ceasefire extended to all Naga regions as a stepping stone to Greater Nagaland, and disintegration of Manipur. Skirmishing between state and central government forces and the I-M faction isn’t rare. Recent news of reviving peace talks with Naga groups, in particular NSCN (I-M), has revived ambitions and deepened suspicions. I-M is piling on the pressure to retain territory and influence in a present and future Nagaland. However, on account of tribal equations, NSCN (I-M) is perceived as largely Tangkhul-led, a tribe with its homeland in Manipur. This creates speculation that the Tangkhul leadership will not be accepted in post-conflict Nagaland.

This theory leaves the Tangkhul rebel leadership to consolidate their hold in Manipur. That in turn does not go down well with non-Naga and non-tribal folk in Manipur—and the attendant bands of ethnicity-based rebel groups—who have for long seen NSCN (I-M) as aggressors. Divide and rule has traditionally been seen by the government of India—especially its intelligence apparatus—as a clever Chanakya-like ploy to tackle dissent and ethnic ambition. The lesson has over time been assiduously applied by regional satraps.

But maps and minds are now so divided that it is nearly impossible to govern. As to petroleum and natural gas, these will remain underground for a while yet.

Sudeep Chakravarti’s latest book is Clear-Hold-Build: Hard Lessons of Business and Human Rights in India. His previous books include Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country and Highway 39: Journeys through a Fractured Land.

There is no escaping racism in India

A strange mix of prejudice, ignorance and centuries-old discriminatory practices make communities stick to regional taboos

By Archisman Dinda

It is an ugly, inexorable truth that Indians are guilty of racism. Though providentially not all of them, but sadly far too many of them — who distressingly reveal such traits more often than one had thought.

Racism, prejudice and xenophobia are rampant in India. It is a strange mixture of prejudice, ignorance and centuries-old discriminatory practices, when communities kept to themselves based on regional taboos. India never misses an opportunity to publicise its rich diversity, but the truth is that Indians are parochial: A large segment of people feel secure to live in their little worlds and protect its borders from any ‘external influence’. Their likes and dislikes for individuals too often have a direct correlation with their attitude towards skin colour and physical features, where even Indian citizens have to bear the brunt of such racist attitude. It extends to cover their language, culture, food, clothes and behaviour. They stereotype each other mercilessly and there are jokes galore about their food, clothes and accents. Colour consciousness permeates the way North Indians treat South Indians.

Indians contemptuously categorise all South Indians as “Madrasis”. Their attitude to their own citizens from the Northeast is no less racist. There, more than colour, it is the Mongoloid physical features of people from that region that attract the ridicule and disdain of those who love to consider themselves as part of the “mainstream”. Casual racism is commonplace. People from the Northeast are derided as “bahadurs” (a common term for Nepalese male servants in India). People ask them whether they are Japanese, Chinese or Korean. For most Indians, the Northeast is another country only accidentally and peripherally Indian. There is total ignorance in most parts of India about the culture and indeed about anything Northeastern. It may be geographically at an arm’s length from the mainland; connected to it by just a narrow strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor. In terms of acceptance and integration, it may as well be another continent!

It is not just physical differences that make people from India’s Northeast stand out in a big city like the national capital of New Delhi. The fact that they hail from societies that are culturally more permissive than “mainstream” India highlights their “otherness” in the eyes of other Indians. A series of separatist insurgencies being waged by the indigenous people of the Northeast also exacerbates tensions.

As migration takes place, across state borders — with young people looking for better education and work opportunities — a kind of xenophobia begins, which sadly is not restricted to the North Indian heartland only. In Maharashtra, many poor, migrant labourers from Bihar are attacked, beaten up and threatened as they go about their daily grind, often working for a pittance. Last year, when two women of Chinese descent from Singapore were molested in Goa, the police delayed the registration of their complaint with the excuse that they thought the women were from the Northeast. Two years ago — triggered by an SMS hate campaign — many residents from Northeast were forced out of Karnataka and back to their home states fearing racist attacks. Only when the Rapid Action Force was deployed in Bangalore did the exodus stop. By then 30,000 people had already left the city.

Indians rarely perceive beauty in dark skin. In fact, most Indians look for pale-skinned brides for their sons. Bridal ads ask for “fair skinned” girls. So skin colour is important and you cannot be beautiful if you are not fair. There are very few countries, where skin whitening creams can do such roaring business, with such impunity. Yet, our celebrities have no compunction advertising the same.

However, racism outside the country elicits an altogether different response. When actor Shah Rukh Khan is frisked by American immigration authorities and detained for questioning, it is racial profiling at its worst and causes a diplomatic row. Four years ago, when Indian students were the targets of racist attacks in Australia, incensed and outraged protests were staged against Australians, both in India and abroad. Calls were made for diplomatic ostracism and proscribing of Australian universities.

As potential victims, Indians are very mindful of it. But as perpetrators, they are reluctant to accept it.

There is another side to Indians, though. The country has always been a haven for persecuted people all around its neighbourhood. India has given shelter to Jews, Parsis, Armenians, Chinese who ran away from the Revolution and Tibetans who fled the Chinese. These people kept their distinct, separate identities and yet they prospered and loved India. Indians in return provided them with physical and economic security to carry on with their lives. Psychologists would argue that an average Indian’s deep-seated inferiority is rooted in a past of subjugation — the colonial desolation of feeling like a second-class citizen in one’s own country. But a deeper resentment now emerges in the form of bipolar urbanism, where protection of self and the turf is paramount and always guarded against any invasion.

This new form of interstate urbanisation creates social tension, as it proposes a fear of cultural and ethnic contamination, giving rise to the fear of losing traditional customs that the society adheres to the core.

Unless, purity of the heart and intent is accepted as the dominant premise of Indian identity, enforcement of such stereotypes will continue as the society oscillates between modernity, tradition and barbarism.

Archisman Dinda is based in Kolkata, India.

China’s Second Coast: Implications for Northeast India

By Namrata Goswami

Northeast of India has been in the news recently with the coming to power of the new NDA government at the Centre. With the appointment of Gen (Retd) V. K. Singh, former Chief of Army Staff, and now a federal minister of Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER), the arresting signs are that India is serious about both development and security in this strategic region, bordering Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar. Tensions along the China-India border in Arunachal Pradesh compounded by China’s territorial claim, cross-border crime in the India-Bangladesh and Indo-Myanmar borders and the presence of non-state armed actors with bases across the international border vindicates the critical need to mainstream the Northeastern imagination. What is, however, interesting, and of strategic significance, besides China’s growing military presence in Tibet, is its activities in Myanmar especially with regard to ambitions for better access to the sea via the Myanmar coast. China has been assiduously building up its ‘second coast’ in Myanmar overlooking the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. While this build up has the undivided attention of India’s Navy and defense establishment, it would be vital to add the future implications for the Northeast, to make a holistic strategic and security assessment.

China in the Indian Ocean Region

A report by Future Directions International, Australia speculates that China’s overarching strategy for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) includes constructing military bases and support facilities on foreign soil in proximity to its trade and energy shipping sea lanes of communication (SLOC).1 These areas also called “String of Pearls” in the IOR originate from Hainan Island in the South China Sea, Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives, Gwadar in Pakistan, stretching to Kenya and Sudan in the horn of Africa. The strategy includes a canal through the Kra isthmus in Thailand bypassing the Malacca Strait. While these “Pearls” provide the logistics for trade in the SLOCs, it is the Chinese moves to militarily secure both the “pearls” and the SLOCs that have interesting side-effects: capabilities of monitoring Indian Naval activity and the potential to encircle India militarily in the IOR.2

Figure 1 - Overview of the Indian Ocean region

Source: Namrata Goswami

The ‘Second Coast’ and its implications for Northeast India

Myanmar’s 2,276 km long coastline in the Bay of Bengal has the potential to provide the ‘second coast’ to China to reach the Indian Ocean and achieve strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Especially transportation logistics to the ‘second coast’ from landlocked south west Chinese provinces like Yunnan have both economic and strategic benefits.
There have been reports of Chinese built SIGINT listening stations in the Andaman Sea at least at Manaung, Hainggyi, Zadetkyi and the Coco Islands in Myanmar. Chinese technicians and instructors have worked on radar installations in naval bases and facilities near Yangon, Moulmein and Mergui. The Indian Coast Guard has intercepted fishing trawlers flying Myanmar flags off the Andaman Islands. On inspection all the crew turned out to be Chinese nationals on expeditions with radio and depth sounding equipment for submarine usage. To what extent these activities and facilities support the Chinese military in monitoring the maritime region around the Andaman &Nicobar Tri command is not yet confirmed.3 Additional reports indicate that the Chinese maybe pushing Myanmar for a listening facility on Ramree Island, Rakhine state, which also holds the deep sea Kyaukpyu port developed for oil and gas transportation. China is building an integrated transport system linking the Kyaukpyu port to Yunnan Province in South West China with the sole aim of reducing energy shipping through the Malacca Strait and South China Sea. The plans include a railroad project from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, to Kyaukpyu to complete the logistics loop to the ‘second coast’. In 2010, Chinese warships on anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean made their first port call to Myanmar.4 China has discussed with President Thein Sein for the PLA Navy’s access to Myanmar’s territorial waters while patrolling the Indian Ocean specifically to provide naval escort and protection to its energy shipments and port facilities at Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal.

Figure 2 - The ‘Second Coast’ of China

Source: Namrata Goswami Further north from Kyaukpyu port is the capital Sittwe of Rakhine state where China has assisted the Myanmar Navy built a naval base. Interestingly, India’s northeast serving Kaladan River Multi modal transport system feeds off the Sittwe port being developed by India, being the closest to the Kolkata port. As per Indian Navy’s assessment, China’s control of Myanmar’s ports from Sittwe in the north to Cheduba, Bassein and a string of other military assets on the ‘second coast’ can enable it to enforce anti-access/area denial to deny the Indian Navy the ability to operate in its littoral waters in the Bay of Bengal. Such escalating scenarios have grave implications for Northeast India from clandestine arms shipments that pass through these waters for the insurgent groups in the region. Contraband arms shipments seized in the past from Chittagong port and Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh originated through arms traffickers in Cambodia and Thailand ports. The coastal border points between Bangladesh and Myanmar have become a haven for contraband arms transit due to inadequate patrolling of their huge coastline in the past by these two countries. These shipments can land on the coasts of South Bangladesh and Northwest Myanmar and then smuggled inland in smaller consignments into Northeast India. The neighboring transit state in Myanmar namely Rakhine has rampant ethnic strife and Chin state has ethnic insurgencies and is not fully controlled by the Myanmar government.
Contiguous to India and Myanmar in Southern Bangladesh several inactive Rohingya militant groups such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) are located out of the Cox’s Bazaar District of Bangladesh. The RSO has the support of terrorist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan including the Hizb-ul Mujahideen of Jammu and Kashmir. The larger Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) organized all the different Rohingya insurgents into one group with alleged links to Al Qaeda.5 Taliban instructed military training camps have been spotted across the coastal border in Northern Rakhine state, Myanmar. These organizations have the support of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and its allies, whose members have been convicted for crimes of arms trafficking for the ULFA and the NSCN (IM).6 Pakistan’s ISI has also been reportedly implicated in facilitating the shipment of contraband arms through the Bay of Bengal meant for northeast insurgent groups.

Figure 3 - The Northeast India Connections

Source: Namrata Goswami There have been reports circulating in the local press of Myanmar of China pressing its proxy militia aka United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers from North Myanmar to be deployed in strength along the new Kyaukpyu-Kunming pipeline for security. If such a scenario proves true on the ground, that would make any Indian security analyst sit up and take notice because of the UWSA’s infamous record of drug trafficking and contraband arms supplied to Northeast insurgents. Ironically, if China backed elements in Myanmar do get access to the Northeast’s borders, insurgent groups may have no further worries of elaborate transportation for purchased Chinese ordnance from Norinco and its illicit franchises in Wa state.
India needs to put in place a well-coordinated approach to secure the maritime and land neighborhood of the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. This would include strengthening naval and coastal patrol assets in the littoral waters off the Andaman and Nicobar islands as well as enhanced strategic assets at the Northeastern borders opposite the ‘second coast’.
India has to work with Bangladesh, which faces a huge national security threat as the landing zone of trafficked arms through the Bay of Bengal by conspiring foreign terrorist organizations operating from its soil with support of local elements. The Myanmar government is challenged by insurgent militias still running loose, who are aided and abetted externally for short sighted strategic gains inside the country. India needs to support Myanmar in establishing the firm rule of the laws of its government throughout its length and breadth. India would need earnest diplomatic efforts to push relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar in a mutually supportive security partnership against common foes of all the legitimate stakeholders in this strategic theatre.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

1. 1. Lindsay Hughes, “Examining the Sino-Indian Maritime Competition: Part 3-China Goes to Sea”, January 22, 2014 at http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1507-examin... (Accessed on May 05, 2014).
2. 2. Ibid
3. 3. Aung Zaw, “Full Steam Ahead”, The Irrawaddy, 17/5, August, 2009 at http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16448 (Accessed on May 16, 2014).
4. 4. Aung Zaw, “Is Burma China’s Satellite State? The Answer is Yes”, BurmaNet News, May 27, 2011 at http://www.burmanet.org/news/2011/05/27/irrawaddy-is-burma-chinas-satell... (Accessed on May 12, 2014).
5. 5. See WikiLeaks cable on ARNO at http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2002/10/02RANGOON1310.html (Accessed on May 19, 2014).
   
6. 6. Hiranmay Karlekar, “ The Great Chittagong Arms Haul and India”, The Pioneer, 

Source:  idsa.in

Naga Identity - Ideals, Parallels, and Reality

By Namrata Goswami

The Naga Hoho, the apex civil society body of the Nagas, while striving for a unified Naga identity, has been fighting a losing battle to bring about reconciliation among the several factions of Naga militias divided along tribal lines or factional loyalties that override ethnicity. The major challenge towards building a cohesive political unit is a fragmented identity engaged in internecine strife with bloodied consequences, which is in opposition to the larger Naga identity, says Namrata Goswami.

For Naga ethnic groups inhabiting the Naga Hills in the Indo-Myanmar trans-borders, the road to peace and prosperity lies in forging a common political Naga identity. There are several models the world over, both old and new, that could serve as examples on a comparable scale for political solidarity amongst geographically neighbouring people with similar but subtly varied cultures. Most of these cultures also are in disadvantageous juxtaposition due to external impositions of State administrations and territorial demarcations, with serious implications for the traditional homeland setup of these ethnic groups. In the past the formation of the Six Nations in North America, more recently the multinational struggle of the Kurds in the Middle East, nearer to home the evolution of the modern nation of Bhutan and currently the campaign for autonomy of Kachin neighbours of the Nagas are good instances of affiliated ethnic groups and tribal clans seeking common ground for collective political goals. The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) of the Kachins has a civilian-run extra-legal bureaucracy providing public services in Kachin State. Bhutan has several ethnic groups with one dominant group-controlled absolute monarchy. The country has recently made a successful transition from monarchy to a constitutional democracy. The Kurds of Kurdistan are currently a nation in the making in a trans-border conflict zone contiguous with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. In early American history, the Six Nations, also called the Iroquois, was a confederacy of different Native American ethnic groups. Today, this powerful super group has unified independent governance, and lives both in the United States and Canada.

As a historical illustration, in contrast to the success of the Iroquois was the Great Sioux Nation made up of several ethnic groups whose traditional homeland once spanned across thousands of square kilometres in the Great Plains of the U.S. and Canada. The Sioux being formidable warriors, but divided along group loyalties, lost a major chunk of their territories to the invading U.S. military, including the Black Hills, which are sacred grounds since ancient times for the Sioux and remains lost to them even today. The once proud peoples have been reduced to living in scattered reservations in the land of their ancestors. In 2007, a group of Sioux travelled to Washington DC to reassert their independence and sovereignty.

Naga Identity: Ideal versus Reality
The Naga Hoho, while being the apex civil society body of the Nagas striving for a unified Naga identity, has been fighting a losing battle bringing reconciliation to the several factions of Naga militias divided along tribal lines or factional loyalties, which override ethnicity.

Naga tribes in their ancestral homeland face the divisive international boundary between India and Myanmar as well as national administrative boundaries in both countries. However, much more than man-made lines on maps, the major challenge towards building a cohesive political unit is a fragmented identity engaged in internecine strife with bloodied consequences, which is in opposition to the larger Naga identity. As an illustration, the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) is an armed ethnic militia of the Zeliangrong Naga group consisting of the smaller Zeme, Liangmei and the Rongmei ethnic groups. Zeliangrong groups are spread over contiguous territories in Nagaland, Assam and Manipur States of India. The Zeliangrong territory is also the domain of other Naga faction rivals of the ZUF fighting for the Naga cause. There have been several incidents of encounters between these competing Naga militias vying to dominate the same geographical space inhabited by the Zeliangrong people, especially between the ZUF and National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak- Muivah faction [NSCN (I-M)].

Figure 1 - Major Naga Ethnic Groups' Areas

© Namrata Goswami
(Click here for a higher resolution image)

On the other end of the Naga identity spectrum is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang faction NSCN (K) headed by S. S. Khaplang, who is a Heimi Naga. The Heimi ethnic group belongs to the larger Tangsang Naga group including the Pangmi, Khaklak and Tangan ethnic groups spread over contiguous territories in Sagaing and Kachin States of Myanmar. In India, the Tangsang group consists of the Tangsa, Muklom and Tutsa in Arunachal Pradesh. The NSCN (K), with its headquarters in Myanmar, signed a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government in 2012. This faction holds sway over Nanyun and Lahe Townships in the Naga Self-Administered Zone, with a liaison office at Khampti town in Sagaing Region of Myanmar.

The Indian Government too has a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (K) since 2001, which has expanded its presence in Naga inhabited areas of India. Traditionally the NSCN (K) has been challenged in Naga inhabited areas of India by the NSCN (I-M). There have been numerous deadly clashes between these two NSCN factions in a fierce feud to dominate maximum Naga inhabited territory. As a few illustrations, a significant development starting in the early 2000s was the advent of NSCN (I-M) cadres into Arunachal Pradesh, originally the NSCN (K)’s backyard, turning the peaceful districts of Changlang, Tirap and the newly formed Longding into a battlefield. Both factions were fighting for dominance in Naga inhabited areas of the State, when in 2009 the NSCN (K) brought in their traditional ally, Myanmar’s heavily armed and battle hardened Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to take on the NSCN (I-M). The NSCN (K) also combined forces against the NSCN (I-M) with non-Naga militants like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur, both of whom have camps in NSCN (K) active areas in Arunachal Pradesh and bordering the Naga Self-Administered Zone, Myanmar. In 2006, the internecine feud between the NSCN factions took an unprecedented turn when the NSCN (K) issued ‘quit notices’ to all Tangkhuls in Nagaland, accusing that ethnic group of ‘masterminding terrorism against the NSCN (meaning the Khaplang faction) and innocent Nagas’.¹

Members of the Tangkhul ethnic group from Manipur are exclusive cadres of NSCN (I-M) and with this move the NSCN (K) was attempting to deny Naga affiliation of the Tangkhuls.

Figure 2 - Areas of the operations of the NSCN factions

© Namrata Goswami
(Click here for a higher resolution image)

The biggest blow to the NSCN (K)’s pan Naga influence in India came with the formation of the NSCN-Khole Kitovi (NSCN-KK) faction on June 7, 2011. The faction was formed by a dissenting group of cadres and their leaders, Khole Konyak and Kitovi Zhimoni, from the NSCN (K). Khole Konyak is from the Konyak ethnic group, the largest amongst the Nagas of Nagaland State. An interesting fact is that the Konyaks are the dominant group in contiguous Lahe Township, headquarters of the Naga Self-Administered Zone in Myanmar and also inhabit Khampti Township of Sagaing Division in Myanmar (See Figure I). Kitovi Zhimoni is a Sumi Naga who are numerous in Nagaland. Since both the NSCN (K) and NSCN (KK) occupy the same ethnic territories, there are bitter and deadly shooting incidents/encounters between the two splinter factions for military dominance. However, presently, the NSCN (KK) are focused on the current boundaries of Nagaland with the goal of pushing out and limiting the NSCN (K) to being a diminished Myanmar based outfit.
Figure 3 - NSCN (I-M)'s claimed Nagalim


© Namrata Goswami
(Click here for a higher resolution image)
NSCN (I-M)’s Nagalim i.e. the lofty goal of an independent ‘Greater Nagaland’ encompasses large swathes of contiguous territory inhabited by both Naga and non-Naga ethnic groups in India and Myanmar. In Myanmar, major chunks of claimed areas have mixed Naga and other ethnic groups populations. Tanai Township in Kachin State have several Naga villages along with the Kachins. Even Khampti Township, which was earlier headquarters of the ‘Burma Naga Hills District,’ have a sizeable minority of Nagas living with Bamar, Shans, Chinese and Indians. Other ‘Naga towns’ like Homalin, inhabited by fewer Nagas, are dominated by Bamar, Shans, Chin, Chinese and Indians. The NSCN (I-M) has not been active in Myanmar to press their claims of Nagalim after a declared ‘unilateral ceasefire’ with the Myanmar government.

The Nagalim territorial claims in India include large strips of territory peripheral to Naga inhabited areas, which have minuscule Naga populations as in Assam’s Cachar, Nagaon, Golaghat, Jorhat, Dibrugarh and Dhemaji districts. In Dima Hasao (formerly North Cachar Hills) district, Nagas are a sizeable minority and a small minority in Karbi Anglong district of Assam. Arunachal Pradesh’s Lohit, Anjaw, Dibang Valley, Lower Dibang Valley and Upper Siang districts are inhabited by ethnic groups such as the Adi, Mishmi, Zekhring, Khampti, Deori, Monpa, Memba, Tai Ahom, Singpho, Chakma and Tibetans, with distinctive identities bearing no affiliation to Naga ethnicity. The NSCN (I-M) however, has been actively engaged in endeavours to expand its influence to all Naga inhabited areas of India as well as mentoring other non-Naga insurgencies of northeast India in a sort of titular ‘mother of all insurgencies’ role.

The leaders of the NSCN (I-M) are Thuingaleng Muivah who is a Tangkhul Naga and Isak Chishi Swu who is a Sumi Naga, both from two of the larger Naga ethnic groups (see Figure 1). The Tangkhul Nagas form a large ethnic group in Manipur and adjoining areas of Sagaing, Myanmar where they are called Somra Nagas. Tangkhuls are the mainstay of the NSCN (I-M) and have taken the faction’s fight to faraway operational zones like Arunachal Pradesh.

However certain major incidents illustrate the complex nature of the ethnocentric support for the NSCN (I-M). In December 2013, the Sumi Nagas of Nagaland threatened to evict the NSCN (I-M) from their lands. The incident was triggered by the attempted rape and molestation of two Sumi women and the grievous injuring of two Sumi men who were all travelling to Zunheboto town. Their vehicle was allegedly waylaid by four armed cadres of the NSCN (I-M) who perpetrated these actions. The Sumis were further incensed by the failure of the NSCN (I-M) to later hand over the culprits hiding inside the guarded designated camp, instead attempting to compromise with the Sumi Hoho and even ‘pay off’ the victims to silence them.

In 2010 the NSCN (I-M)’s General Secretary Th. Muivah made abortive attempts to visit his native village in Manipur. These visits were stiffly opposed by the Manipur State government as earlier ones had triggered violence in Naga inhabited areas of the State. The NSCN (I-M)’s inclusion of Naga inhabited areas of Manipur into Nagalim evokes a deeply resentful response from the Meiteis for whom the issue is very sensitive.

The complexity of ethnic boundaries, as has been illustrated above, forced divisions of ethnic communities inhabiting the border areas of India and Myanmar by the imposition of an arbitrary international boundary with little regard to local realities, and the framework of policy-making that views ethnic groups as somehow pre-modern and in need of development are the major existential and ideational challenges. Inherent in this framework is a notion that somehow, the so called mainstream culture and institutions are themselves not ethnically slanted but universal.² In this scenario, policy making is propelled by the ‘command culture of legitimacy’ that the public administrators espouse, especially in dealing with minority communities, which can backfire. Consequently, what is required, and which has not been developed yet, is a deep seated understanding of the culture of identity recognition and preservation. Most importantly, since negotiations with armed groups in the Northeast are conducted in a scenario of threat, it is important to understand this framework so that there are no false expectations.³

The challenge for armed groups like the NSCN (I-M), NSCN (K), and NSCN (KK) is to meet the claim of representation of a common Naga identity and community, already run asunder by the territorial divisions brought about by a modern state mechanism as well as by the internecine clan/tribe-based fights that threaten the notion of common ethnic identity. Only time will tell whether, like the Great Iroquois, the Nagas can form a common supra-national/transnational structure that provides a common platform to their way of life and traditions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

References:
¹For more, see “NSCN-K Quit Notice”, The Telegraph, January 30, 2007, at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070130/asp/frontpage/story_7324330.asp (Last accessed on June 14, 2014).
²For more on this, please see Wsevolod W. Isajiw, “Approaches to Ethnic Conflict Resolution: Paradigms and Principles”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 24 (2000), pp. 105-124.
³Ibid

(Dr. Namrata Goswami is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, D.C., and a Fulbright-Nehru Senior Fellowship recipient in 2012-2013. The views expressed in this article are solely that of the author.)

A Few Minutes With The Iron Lady Of India

By Ravi Nitesh

An interaction with the world’s longest hunger striker
















































It was a meeting, an interaction with not a celebrity, neither any famous educationist, nor a politician, but for me, it was more than that. It was an interaction wherein I found that she is not an educationist, but is a subject of research papers and that her life itself is a source of learning. I found that she is not a politician, but her fight was such that it became one of the very important political movements. I found that she is not a celebrity but people were fascinated with her, media wanted to click her and the police surrounded her. Afterall, it was the case of World’s longest hunger striker who has been on a hunger-strike since last 14 years in the Manipur state of India with the demand to repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act or AFSPA.

AFSPA is a special act that empowers the armed forces of India with an extraordinary power when they operate in a conflict area where AFSPA is imposed. These extraordinary powers include the right to shoot, torture on mere suspicion and arrest without warrant. The forces are also empowered with legal impunity. No offence can be registered without any prior approval of central government. This act has led to extra-judicial killings, rapes, kidnapping, torture and fake encounters by security forces but not a single permission was ever given by the Government of India to prosecute any army personals.

In protest against the havoc created by AFSPA, in 2000, Irom Chanu Sharmila decided to sit on a hunger-strike against AFSPA for a day in the hope that the Government that will listen to her. Today, she is in her 14th year of hunger-strike. Yet, her faith has remained unshaken. She is hopeful that the Government will listen to her. As her supporter, I have not only admired her but have been deeply amazed and inspired by her relentless faith and determination. Even after 14 years of awaiting justice, even with health problems, she remains strong and determined. It has always been a mystery to me and it was this one thing that I took with me when I got the privilege to interact with her.

Throughout the interaction, she had a smiling face. She resonated positivity and calmness. She was soft-spoken but her determination was powerful even in her words.

She had started her talk with the story of King Ashoka who as a warrior had fought many kings but had became tearful and sensitive after the Kalinga war which had claimed thousands of lives. He had become so moved that he had renounced war and had started working for peace. She hoped that the Government may also become like Ashoka. She expressed her hope that the Government will also realize. They will improve themselves. They will understand that war/violence is never the solution.

Since her demand to repeal of AFSPA is shown as confined to Manipur, I inquired about it and she said that AFSPA is an inhuman law and it does not deserve to be in any region. On my question that what will you do if the government will be agreed to lift it from Manipur but not from J&K. She remarked (with smile), “Let them lift from Manipur first and then they must do it from all other states including Jammu and Kashmir”.

On asking that what keeps her going? What has motivated her to have continued their struggle for so long? She smiled and replied, “conscience”. Her conscience doesn’t allow her to see this injustice. She refuted the claim that she is committing suicide. She remarked that she loves life.

I was moved by her simplicity. She is a simple person and in that simplicity, lies her strength. She has been awaiting justice even though she was never a direct victim. She was not a political activist yet she decided to devote her life for justice. She was not doing it for any reason, any political motive but for humanity. She decided to fight because she wanted that everyone should have the right to justice. Everyone should possess the same rights. She is an ordinary citizen, she said, but with a conscience.

Ravi Nitesh is a Petroleum Engineer, Founder- Mission Bhartiyam, Core Member- Save Sharmila Solidarity Campaign

follow on twitter: www.twitter.com/ravinitesh Blog: www.ravinitesh.blogspot.com

Photo By Ravi Nitesh

Source: Countercurrents.org

World-Class Training Facilities in The Northeast Will Help Football in India

By Rajdeep Sardesai

Forget power cuts, ‘Ache din’ are here for the Indian sports fan. Over the next few weeks, the world will be tied into football fever. We will be dazzled by the artistry of a Messi and Ronaldo; fans in Kolkata will wear Brazilian shirts; pubs in Mumbai will have special screenings; and life in Goa and Kerala will revolve around a ball. We will celebrate the spirit of the beautiful game even as the national team won’t be playing it yet again.

In the 84-year history of the event, we have not participated in the World Cup finals even once. We almost did in 1950, coincidentally also hosted by Brazil, but had to withdraw because we were not allowed to play barefoot. The 1950s and early 60s are perhaps the golden age of Indian soccer: We won the gold at the inaugural Asian Games in 1951, repeated our success in 1962, and finished fourth in the Melbourne Olympics in 1956.

Recent years have been sadly more difficult for the Indian football team. We are ranked 154th in the world (Pakistan is ranked 169th, which may provide consolation to some); we lost the South Asian football title last year to Afghanistan and even struggled to beat tiny Maldives. While another pint sized country like Honduras will participate in the World Cup, our best hope of actually being in the finals may lie in hosting the tournament one day.

Ironically, there is some evidence to suggest that interest in the sport itself has never been higher. Television ratings of global football games, especially the English Premier League, are steadily climbing. There is, in fact, more ‘live’ football now than ever before on Indian television. The inter-club tournament is being supplemented by an IPL style football league later this year. The World Inter-club tournament will be hosted by India in 2017 as will a global junior tournament.

The sport has also moved beyond its traditional powerhouses — West Bengal, Kerala and Goa — and discovered fresh catchment areas. Nowhere is the craze for football more visible than in the North-East. Mizoram, quite remarkably, won the national Santosh Trophy this year; clubs like Lajong FC in Shillong have made a mark in top events; and Baichung Bhutia has stirred a football mini-revolution in his home state of Sikkim. And yet, why is the glass of Indian football so painfully half-empty? Why is the world’s only genuine mass game unable to take a great leap forward among the wider masses in the country?

The obvious answer must lie in our near-fatal obsession with cricket. When one sport so overwhelmingly dominates our lives, then what chance for any other sport to survive and prosper? Our original national game, hockey, has already been pushed to the margins, so what hope did football, not blessed with the same golden traditions, ever have? Cricket monopolises talent, resources and attention, leaving us perilously close to being seen as a one-sport nation, although recent successes in the Olympics in individual sports like shooting, badminton and wrestling have offered some respite.

And yet, to blame cricket for the woes of other Indian sports is self-defeating. The fact is, games like football have wallowed in mediocrity for much too long. Kolkatans, for example, have remained content in the battles between Mohun Bagan and East Bengal, almost mirroring the plight of a state being left behind by the rest. Kerala too never looked to raise the bar of the sport. Is it merely a coincidence that the Left, which has often looked at sport as an elite luxury, ruled Kerala and Bengal for years?

The solution doesn’t lie in simply getting more foreign players to participate in domestic leagues. Nor will it change by bringing IPL-style glamour into the sport with the likes of Ranbir Kapoor and John Abraham now owning football teams. It won’t change by merely showing more of the sport on television either. In fact, the telecast of global football leagues only underscores the difference between the rest of the world and us.

The key to the future then is two-fold. First, we need to recognise that football requires special physical attributes that are ill-suited to many parts of the country. What countries like Japan and South Korea have shown though is that raw power alone doesn’t win you football games; there is space for speed and quick reflexes. The footballers of the North-East are uniquely blessed in this regard. A focussed programme of football academies and world-class training aimed at this part of the country will have the most direct impact on our football. If Haryana could throw up India’s wrestling heroes, why can’t the North-East produce an assembly line of quality footballers? And why can’t business houses take this up as a challenge and part of corporate social responsibility for an oft-neglected region?

The other long-term solution lies in simply giving our children a chance to play. Per capita playgrounds in this country are among the lowest in the world. We shrink open spaces in our cities and have schools without sports grounds, and yet expect to produce international athletes. Cricket is an exception because there is an eco-system that now rewards excellence; for the rest, there is little chance of growth without infrastructure.

In Mumbai, for example, the Shiv Sena has now proposed to convert the 225 acre Race Course in the heart of the city into a theme park. The idea isn’t bad: A city like Mumbai needs more green lungs for its common citizens to enjoy rather than retain it as a privilege for Turf Club members. A space for people to walk, and maybe for our children to just kick a ball, isn’t that a way to a healthier and more ‘sporty’ future?

Post-script: Since the football World Cup doesn’t evoke the nationalist passions that cricket does, I am, like many Goans, seeking refuge in our colonial past. Portugal and Brazil are my teams for the Cup!

Rajdeep Sardesai is editor-in-chief, IBN 18 network

North East Energy For Bangladesh – Analysis

The Indian prime minister’s overtures to SAARC countries are an opportunity for India and Bangladesh to enhance an energy partnership. Intensified exchanges will benefit both: India’s North East, rich in energy sources, will get investments while Bangladesh, a ready market, can improve its energy security


By Amit Bhandari

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiative of inviting SAARC heads of state for his swearing-in ceremony on May 26 is an opportunity to deepen India’s ties with its closest neighbours. But it is especially an opportunity to expand the growing engagement with Bangladesh in the energy sector.
Both the countries can gain in the process—Bangladesh can address its growing energy and fuel needs as well as lower its energy costs. In turn, India will gain from increased economic activity in the north eastern states, which are rich in reserves of coal, oil, gas and hydropower and can become an energy source for Bangladesh.

Bangladesh relies on domestically produced natural gas to meet almost 75% of its energy consumption. The rest is made up by approximately 20% oil and 5% coal.1 However, the country is now facing a shortage of domestically produced natural gas.2 As a result, it has set up power plants that run on imported furnace oil and diesel, both of which are very expensive options.3
Domestic oil production is minimal and petroleum products are almost entirely imported. The country has its own coal deposits, estimated to be 3.3 billion tonnes spread over five reserves. But it produces only 1 million tonnes of coal per annum because not all of the coal can be mined in a commercially viable manner.

Only one of the five reserves has been brought into production so far, where the coal seams are closest to the surface, at approximately 118-509 metres. The other reserves are at much greater depths, starting at 300 metres. The largest of these, with approximately 1 billion tonnes, is at a depth of over 600 metres, which makes it unviable to mine.

Derated capacity of BPDB plants, June 2014

	Capacity (mw)	% of total
Coal	200	2.04
Furnace oil	52	0.53
Gas	6,224	63.62
Heavy fuel oil	1,926	19.69
High speed diesel	661	6.76
Hydro	220	2.25
Imported	500	5.11
Total	9,783	100

Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB)

Therefore, Bangladesh has its task cut out on the energy front. It must produce more gas and this requires more efforts in exploration. It will also have to shift from expensive furnace oil and diesel to the relatively cheaper coal-burning power plants. Until then, it will have to continue to import power and coal to address current shortages.

India is already involved in supporting Bangladesh in all three areas: exploring for oil and natural gas; building more coal-based power plants; and importing power and coal.

For natural gas, a 50-50 joint venture of India’s upstream petroleum companies, ONGC and Oil India, has been awarded two shallow water blocks off the Bangladesh coast. A production-sharing contract with state-owned Petrobangla has also been signed. 5

For coal plants, India’s public sector National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) is developing a 1,320 mw coal fired power plant in Bagerhat district of Bangladesh in a 50-50 joint venture with the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB). This project is expected to be complete by 2018 and BPDB will purchase its output for 25 years.

India exports a small quantity of coal to Bangladesh (approximately 1.5 million tonnes) and exports 475 mw of electricity to Bangladesh, from Tripura.

But more can be done, specifically with petroleum products, to benefit both the countries. Bangladesh imports crude oil as well as refined petroleum products such as diesel and petrol. Most of Bangladesh’s petro-products currently come from Malaysia and Singapore. During 2012-13, Bangladesh imported petroleum products worth only $138 million from India, while imports from Malaysia and Singapore added up to $1,362 million.

India is already a major exporter of such products. Its four oil refineries in Assam have the capacity to produce 7 million tonnes of petroleum products. The consumption of petroleum products in the seven north eastern states is only 2.88 million tonnes.10 Exporting petroleum products from Assam to Bangladesh via a pipeline makes economic sense for both sides: it is cheaper than moving them by ship, as is currently done by Bangladesh. This will lower the logistics cost for Bangladesh. For India, it will be cheaper to pipe these products to Bangladesh than to transport them to other Indian or overseas markets.

The largest and most modern of the Assam refineries is the government-owned 3 million tonne Numaligarh Refinery Limited (NRL). NRL is planning to expand from its current capacity to 8-9 million tones. The expansion will be financially unviable without additional markets. The company is already exploring the possibility of a pipeline from Siliguri in West Bengal to Bangladesh.11 While such a project will make commercial sense, the decision and its progress and execution depend on the willingness of governments to work together.

Such an overture can even catalyse other economic gains for India, such as improved access to the north eastern states if Bangladesh allows transit rights. This has already happened in a limited way in the energy sector in Tripura. The state has gas reserves with limited local use, and transporting them to other parts of India is not feasible. Converting the gas into electricity and transmitting it via power lines is easier. To enable construction of ONGC Tripura Power Company’s 720 mw power project that runs on natural gas, Bangladesh permitted movement of equipment through its territory.12 It is this power plant that is exporting a large portion of its output to Bangladesh.

The Tripura power company is just one example of how mutually beneficial opportunities can be tapped if the two countries work together. This can be repeated across other links of the energy chain.

Amit Bhandari is Fellow, Energy & Environment Studies, Gateway House.
This article was published at Gateway House and is reprinted with permission.
References:
1. British Petroleum. BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

2. Petrobangla.Petrobangla: Annual Report 2012.
p. 8.
3. Bangladesh Power Development Board. Power Generation Units (Fuel Type Wise).

4. Energy and Mineral Resources Division: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Energy and Mineral Resources Division.

5. ONGC Videsh Limited. ONGC Videsh and Oil India signs Production Sharing Contract for Two Shallow water Exploration Blocks in Bangladesh.

6. Lok Sabha. Agreement between India and Bangladesh.

7. Lok Sabha. Export of Coal.

8. Lok Sabha. Export of power to Bangladesh.

9. Bangladesh Bank. Annual Review of Import payments 2012-13.
(accessed June 1, 2014) pp. 26 – 32.
10. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India. Indian Petroleum & Natural Gas Statistics 2012-13.

11. Numaligarh Refinery Limited. Annual Report 2012-13.
pp. 30.
12. ONGC. Annual Report 2011-12.

Can Rape Ever Be Right?

By Magda Mis

Members of the All Assam Photojournalist Association wear black sashes over their mouths at a protest against the rape of a photojournalist by five men in an abandoned textile mill in Mumbai. Picture Guwahati, northeast India, August 24, 2013. REUTERS/Utpal Baruah

Shocking as it may be, there are men who think rape is OK. There are women, too, who believe it’s the victims who should be blamed for the crime.

Is downplaying rape by debating whether it’s right or wrong or diverting blame from the perpetrator to the victim just a harmless talk shop, or can it have more serious implications? Can it perhaps send potential offenders the false message that “everybody makes mistakes” and that rape can sometimes be an accident caused by the victim and therefore excused?

On Thursday Indian ruling party politician Babulal Gaur declared that rape “sometimes is right, sometimes is wrong”. For Gaur rape is a “social crime” that doesn’t even take place unless reported to police.

A bit like saying a person is not dead unless a death certificate is produced.

Another politician, Poland’s Janusz Korwin-Mikke, said he didn’t really understand what rape was.
“Raped, what does it mean, raped?” he asked during a television debate in May. "Women are always pretending that they are showing some resistance and this is normal. One has to know when one can and when one can't," he said.

A number of men insist, like Korwin-Mikke, that they are getting confused signals from women; as a result some feel perfectly entitled to have sex with them without making sure this is what they want.

A Guardian article described a man accused by a woman of raping her. He had had sex with her while she was asleep and had felt for some time previously that she was giving him the strong impression that she wanted to have sex with him.

However, just as it’s not only women who are victims of rape, it’s not only men who downplay the crime.

A widely publicised gang rape committed on a 23-year-old student in India two years ago prompted a comment from a female Indian party leader, Asha Mirje, accusing rape victims themselves of inviting the crime.

"Rapes take place also because of a woman's clothes, her behaviour and her presence at inappropriate places," said Mirje.

But is it really relevant what women are wearing, where they are, how they are behaving? In other words, can rape ever be excused because the perpetrator believed the victim “invited” the crime? Or, in Babulal Gaur’s words, can rape ever be “right”?

Another politician, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, clearly disagrees:

"I can't say often enough it doesn't matter what coat she was wearing, whether she drank too much, whether it was in the back of a car, in her room, on the street, it does not matter. It does not matter if she initially said yes and changed her mind and said no. No means no, wherever it is stated," Biden said at the launch of a White House report on preventing rape and sexual violence in colleges.

It doesn’t matter what the perpetrator’s excuse is: rape means forcibly executed sexual intercourse. Rape means violence.

I was stunned when, during research for this blog, I typed “rape victims” and Google’s only auto-complete suggestion was “rape victims crime scene photos.”

The sad reality is not only that some people say they don’t know what rape is and others think the victims are to blame. Or that somebody would feed their sick curiosity by looking at pictures from rape crime scenes.

What is perhaps more alarming is that there are people who trivialise rape, who do not see as it really is: a serious crime which should not be played down under any circumstances.

As Biden said: "No man has a right under any circumstance other than self defense, no man has a right ever to raise his hand to a woman, period, end of story. It is assault, if they do".

Polish prosecutors are investigating whether Korwin-Mikke’s comments warrant prosecution for incitement to rape, and rightly so.

Maybe if more people think before they speak and stop playing down the fact that rape is a serious crime, then perhaps others will start understanding the consequences of their behaviour and stop before it’s too late.

There is no room for debating whether rape can be right or wrong. It is an act of violence and it’s always wrong.

The North-Eastern Challenge

By Sanjoy Hazarika

In a region like the North-east, where few groups actually constitute a numerical majority, the State has been involved in unending and fatiguing efforts to deal with a cycle of demands and counter-demands

The recent attacks and killings in Assam, Manipur and Meghalaya by armed non-State groups represent a challenge and test for the Narendra Modi government and the need to understand the frustrating complexities of the North-eastern region.

Things are not being made easy after strident demands by the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party MPs from Assam to rid the State of “Bangladeshis,” a phrase that many from the minority community say is aimed at targeting them, irrespective of nationality, and one that can swiftly turn into a security nightmare not just for governments in Delhi and Dispur, but also for ordinary people caught up in a storm. For a moment, the “Bangladeshi” issue has moved away from the headlines because of other events that have captured public attention.

A Superintendent of Police in Assam’s Karbi Anglong district was shot dead when his tiny unit was engaged in a fight with an armed group wanting a separate state for the Karbi community in the jungles of Assam’s eastern hills — the second major setback that the police in the State have suffered, an Additional Superintendent having fallen earlier to the bullets of an armed faction from the Bodo tribe.

Some 400 kilometres west of Karbi Anglong, blurred images emerge of a woman who was executed gangland style execution after she resisted rape by men from the “Garo National Liberation Army” in Meghalaya. The GNLA was launched five years back by a former police officer, who is now in police custody. But the group is still active, extorting funds, and carrying out strikes against security forces and civilians.

Rise of insurgent factions

The law and order situation in the Garo Hills, the home district of Meghalaya Chief Minister Mukul Sangma, is such that a top official says that his men could not have moved to the village of the murdered woman at night as they got word of a possible attack on police convoys. They got the news when the woman’s family walked into a police station and told them what had happened. This is a poor reflection of police capacity, underscoring the need for better equipment as well as strong political leadership.

These issues underline both the ethnic and social complexity of the North-eastern region, home to over 200 ethnic communities, as well as how political mobilisation and armed violence have changed in these past years. While the principal militant factions have been sitting at the negotiating table with New Delhi or in “designated camps” for years, be it the Nagas, Assamese, Karbis, Bodos and Garos, they are being sharply challenged by smaller, more violent, breakaway factions.

Armed with new weapons which are easily available in the illegal small arms markets in the region, combined with new technology and better connectivity, these groups are demonstrating the seamless manner in which they can move across State borders.

The level of violence is especially stark when contrasted with the extraordinary beauty of the countryside across all States, although the towns and cities, as elsewhere, are turning into ugly urban sprawls. The Bodo-Muslim riots in 2012, which displaced nearly half a million people, and the incident earlier this year when over 30 men, women and children were butchered by armed men in the Bodo areas are examples of such violence. All the victims this time were Muslim and the resonance of public anger — of minority as well as non-Muslim, non-Bodo groups — was visible in the overwhelming victory of a non-Bodo candidate in a Lok Sabha constituency.

Amid this fabric, what is often forgotten is the chain of interconnected events and the contemporary political narrative: thus, in the Bodo Territorial Council areas, the first attacks on Muslim and other groups took place in the Bodo areas in 1993. Earlier, few such incidents were reported. There were tensions over land issues but these had not spiralled into the bloodshed that followed later.

There is another process that the Modi government will be aware of — that of manufactured consent. In a region like the North-east, where few groups actually constitute a numerical majority — one is not speaking on religious but ethnic grounds here — the State has been involved in unending and fatiguing efforts to deal with a cycle of demands, counter-demands, agitations and resolutions. This has dominated the political discourse in the region. Thus, almost every State experiencing conflict is witness to a non-violent process by a group demanding greater powers — such as for a community or group of communities, putting forth an overall set of political demands such as greater autonomy or a separate State. Yet, this runs almost in parallel with violent movements for, ironically, either similar demands or, going a step further, for “independence.”

This began with the Naga movement in the 1950s and spread to the Mizo Hills, Manipur, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya, although in the latter, armed movements rose against their own State governments in the 1990s.

In almost every movement, “outsiders” have been targeted — whether it is those from another State, of a different linguistic or ethnic group or the so-called “Bangladeshis.” Yet, today, in almost every State, major armed organisations which have thrown challenges to Delhi over the past six decades have abandoned the gun and are either negotiating with the Centre or engaging in ceasefire. The most visible sign of this was the landslide victory of a former leader of the United Liberation Front of Assam from the Bodo areas. He crushed the official Bodo candidate in the Lok Sabha election and took his oath of allegiance to the Constitution in Parliament — the very Constitution against which he had taken up arms earlier.

Yet, agreements and semi-agreements have been the pattern in the region. These have a history of spawning breakaway groups which claim to be “anti-talks,” yet want to be at the table with the big boys; they hit hard at easy targets, showing the difficulties that police and other forces face in moving through difficult terrain. The smaller groups too want a share of the funds flowing into the region and the power that goes with it.

Political will is critical to dealing with this. Small States like Meghalaya have been adversely hit by the disinclination of both government and Opposition leaders in taking a tough line on the “boys” in the Garo Hills. Earlier Chief Ministers had demonstrated political courage, authorising crackdowns that forced Khasi and Garo groups to the negotiating table. It is also not a mere coincidence that the armed groups concentrate on the coal-rich areas of the Garo Hills where extraction is highly profitable and where prominent political figures are said to have business interests.

Thus, a pattern has emerged over the past decades — New Delhi, to use a BJP catchphrase, has always tried to appease the largest group agitating or fighting for a cause or one which is prepared to talk. It has not tried to resolve the core issue or issues which involve a broader and deeper dialogue with other groups, and with non-government and civil society figures, scholars and organisations. Without that kind of work, through mediators and counsellors, no agreement can work or last.

Perhaps Delhi thinks it is just a matter of being politically “realistic” — but such realism has backfired time and again. This was most evident during the standoff between Telangana and Andhra.

And the North-east, with its many divergent and parallel ethnic mobilisation processes, is a far more difficult place. This then is the problem with what one could call “manufactured comfortable consent” — such agreements rarely last,for they are designed for short-term gains such as placating a demand, winning an election, creating a new elite and giving the government some breathing space. Often, the agitators are not as representative as they claim to be.

Focus therefore is of the essence, and not haste.

No to rights abuse

The Centre should not be diverted by recent events and instead concentrate on speeding up the prolonged Naga negotiations (now on for nearly 18 years). The Delhi-Naga talks do not even have an official negotiator as former Nagaland Chief Secretary Raghaw Pandey quit before the election to join the BJP but did not get a nomination. Other negotiations also need to be pursued with vigour and vision.

The Modi government must send a clear and unambiguous message to its members and followers that they cannot take law into their hands over the issue of “Bangladeshis.” This could spread fear, tension, mistrust and worse in Assam. Due process must be followed — otherwise there is acute danger of violence, tragedy and abuse of human rights just because of a person’s religion. Isn’t the Pune murder of the young Muslim techie by Hindu thugs a warning and wake-up call? The media must play a sober role in this because definitions of “Bangladeshis” are often blurred and arbitrary.

We need to abide by the recent judgment in the Meghalaya High Court which, while stating the obvious, defined a Bangladeshi as someone who came to India after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Many tend to look at much earlier cut off dates in their search for “illegal migrants.”

New Delhi needs to inform all State governments in the region — whichever the party — that the murder of innocents, of whichever ethnicity, religion or language group, and the abuse of rights by armed groups (or security forces) and local thugs is unacceptable. Such violations need to be met with a cabrated robust response aimed at showing results in a specific time frame.

(Sanjoy Hazarika is director of the Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.)

Railways Must Look East

By SN Mathur

In the highly competitive world economy of today, transport cost is a significant determinant of competitiveness, which makes an efficient surface transport network a concomitant for better economic integration. Somehow, the surface transport networks in several parts of Asia continue to be fragmented, and consequently their potential as instruments of economic growth at the regional level has not been fully realised.

The idea of linking the railway networks of Asia, to provide international connections—not only between the region’s countries but also with the Middle Eastern and European systems—was first expressed in the ’60s by initiating the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) project. The objective was to shorten transit times between nations and regions and serve as a tool for their economic growth through expansion of international trade. Besides, because transporting goods by rail is faster than through the sea, rail connectivity was expected to reduce transport cost substantially. Rail can also carry a much higher volume of freight traffic than road.

The TAR envisages the creation of an integrated freight railway network across Europe and Asia. When the idea was conceived, the objective was to provide a continuous 14,000km rail link between Singapore and Istanbul, with possible onward links to Europe and Africa. Today, the network has about 81,000km of rail routes—the 12,600km Southeast Asia corridor, the 32,500km Northeast Asia corridor, the 13,200km Central Asia and Caucasus corridor and the 22,600km South Asia-Iran-Turkey corridor—and connects 28 countries.

In a major policy decision, the Indian Railways has agreed to participate in the TAR link between Europe and Southeast Asia. The project, being considered by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific under the Asian Land Infrastructure Development Project, will help identify and evaluate the development and operation of a network of routes between South Asia and Europe. The routes are supposed to run via Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The growth of international trade, continued surge of containerised freight through the ports of Asia-Pacific and the recognition of greater regional integration are encouraging countries to seek efficient connectivity through transport networks. It provides the railways of the region an opportunity to upgrade their existing infrastructure with the aim of defining and operating international corridors.

With this in mind, the countries involved decided to define a framework within which they can discuss and plan the future expansion and operation of the Trans-Asian Railway Network. The Ministerial Conference on Transport held in Korea in 2006 adopted a Regional Action Programme for Transport Development in Asia and the Pacific. It aimed to promote an integrated approach to transport planning with a view to facilitating efficient logistics in the region. Accordingly, 18 member states signed the inter-governmental agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network that formalises the coordinated development of TAR. Other countries, including India, signed the agreement in the subsequent years. It envisages completion of the ambitious project by 2025.

The economies of south and Southeast Asia have been growing rapidly due to easing of trade barriers, increase in foreign direct investment and greater integration with the global economy. However, intra-regional trade and investment has been relatively limited because of various bottlenecks in trade infrastructure. Increased connectivity between the two sub-regions can help improve industrial efficiency and productivity, expanding the market size and ensuring long-term economic prosperity.

India has demonstrated its economic and technological capabilities for further integration with the regional and global economy. Myanmar being the only land bridge between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations and India, its importance as a regional logistics and trading hub cannot be overstated. Rail connectivity between India and Myanmar is completely absent. Indian Railways has, therefore, agreed to build a 350km route between India and Myanmar, which will require about `3,000 crore, part of which will be borne by Myanmar. In the first phase it will take up construction of 97km new rail connection between Jiribam and Tupul (Manipur) costing `728 crore. Later, this link will be extended to Moreh inside Myanmar territory. These links would eventually be integrated into the proposed Trans-Asian Railway Network.

With the construction of a rail corridor between India and Myanmar, India will be linked by rail to Southeast Asia, and eventually to China, its largest trading partner in Asia, registering about $ 60 billion worth of trade last year alone. The recent political reform process in Myanmar now makes possible rail and road connectivity between south and Southeast Asia that did not appear feasible a few years ago. The implementation of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement has further facilitated intra-regional trade and investment liberalisation. It is particularly important in the context of India’s Look East policy which cannot be operationalised without the participation of the Northeast.

For various historical and political reasons, the Northeast has remained cut off from its economic and social ties with neighbouring Myanmar, Bangladesh and China, and has had to depend for almost all its supplies from mainland India only. The new rail connectivity, that shall be a part of the TAR network, will help transform the region’s economy, serving as a corridor for movement of raw material, semi-finished and finished products. It can also play a pivotal role in the development of commerce and cultural exchange with the Southeast Asian countries. Manipur can then become one of the key links not only between India and Myanmar but also between the whole of South Asia and Southeast Asia.

The new Indian government has realised the urgency of fast-tracking infrastructure development of the region by appointing a former Army chief to head the ministry of north east development. This will accelerate the progress of various projects incorporated in the North Eastern Region Vision Document 2020 aimed at promoting the flow of peoples and goods, expansion of communication networks, opening up of markets and generating employment.

The author is a former MD of Railway Finance Corporation.

E-mail: mathur.surendra@gmail.com

Why Was Myanmar’s President Not Invited to Modi’s Swearing-In Ceremony?

What this tells us about India’s policy toward Southeast Asia

By Akhilesh Pillalamarri

Prime Minister Narendra Modi broke new ground last Monday by inviting the leaders of “every nation on India’s periphery” to his swearing-in ceremony. These countries included all the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries as well as SAARC observer Mauritius. Even the Prime Minister in exile of Tibet was invited. Despite this impressive guest list, the leader of one of India’s neighbors, Myanmar, was not invited.

This fact is made all the more glaring because the omission of an invite seems to go against the new government’s desire to cultivate more substantial relations with its neighbors. India and Myanmar share a long 1,624-kilometer (1,009 mi) border. However, in all likelihood, the lack of an invite for Myanmar’s President Thein Sein was not a mistake or a deliberate omission, but simply something that was on nobody’s mind. Politicians and the media in both countries did not seem to expect that Myanmar would even be invited, as evidenced by the fact that the media in neither country made an issue out of Myanmar’s non-invite.

This is a function of how both countries view each other. Despite the fact that Myanmar is an observer in the SAARC, it does not have strong ties with South Asia and is more oriented towards Southeast Asia, where it is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  From the vantage point of New Delhi too, policy toward Myanmar is treated not through the lens of South Asian bonhomie but under the aegis of India’s Look East Policy. This lack of closeness may come as a surprise to some, but despite rhetoric about historical, cultural, and religious ties, Myanmar and India went different ways centuries ago with Myanmar drawing closer to Thailand and China. After the British conquest of Burma in the nineteenth century, what is today’s Myanmar was ruled as a province of British India but was separated and made an independent colony in 1937, largely at the demand of Burmese nationalists who did not identify with the nationalist Indian independence movement.

Relations with Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, will undoubtedly be given more priority in the upcoming few months. The previous Congress government unfortunately neglected India’s relations with its Asian neighbors, its elite English-speaking and Western-educated leaders seemingly forgetting that India is in fact in Asia and not in the West — a psychological orientation reflected in external policy. The Indian nationalist narrative reflected in BJP thinking is, on the other hand, more oriented towards Asia. To begin with, India will seek greater connectivity with Southeast Asia and land routes must necessarily pass through Myanmar. India has recently called for a bus route from Imphal in Northeastern India to Mandalay in Myanmar. Potentially more important is Myanmar’s location between India and China. Prime Minister Modi is especially keen on improving India’s lukewarm relations with China, which had experienced glacial progress under the previous government. Congress may have deliberately misinformed the public of the nature of India’s past interactions with China in order to create a sense of martyrdom to cover up for its failures during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. In a recent conversation with Modi, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang warmly suggested the construction of a Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor that would connect Kunming in China to India’s Northeast through Myanmar.

Such a connection to Myanmar, Southeast Asia, and China would be a boon to India’s much neglected Northeast region. Northeast India is significantly different from the rest of India in terms of languages, religion, culture, and even race and is in many ways more Southeast Asian than South Asian. Surrounded by Myanmar, China, and Bangladesh on almost all four sides and connected to the rest of India via only a narrow corridor, greater interconnectivity with international neighbors could bring this region much needed economic development and stem the dozens of insurgencies that have plagued the area for the past 60 years. That the Modi government means to improve the situation in Northeast India is clear by the appointment of a seasoned former general, Vijay Kumar (VK) Singh to the federal Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (MDONER). Singh is expected to infuse some much needed dynamism into the region.

The Modi government’s initial focus on its neighbors in South Asia is not at odds with improving relations with Southeast Asia. The Look East Policy was a cornerstone of the previous BJP government and in all likelihood will be given more importance under Modi, given his marked interest in pursuing stronger relations with his eastern neighbors. However, the Look East Policy makes more sense if it occurs in tandem with economic integration in South Asia, as it makes little sense for India to liberalize trade with Southeast Asian countries without pursuing a similar policy in its own backyard. This is why South Asia has been accorded the greater initial priority, especially since economic integration and bilateral trade in the region is currently miniscule.

Akhilesh Pillalamarri is an Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat.