By Sanjoy Hazarika
Former
prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sonia Gandhi in Aizawl, Mizoram, after
the signing of the Mizo Peace Accord, July 11, 1986. (Picture credit:
Press Information Bureau)
In 1969 the Fifth Finance Commission recommended the
creation of ‘special status’ for three states: The then undivided state
of Assam, Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir. The recommendation was to
economically help states that are faced by disadvantages of geography,
international borders, low population density and other factors.
Over the years, as Assam fragmented with Meghalaya being carved out
of it as a state and Mizoram as a Union Territory (which later became a
state), and new states emerged from the former kingdoms of Manipur and
Tripura, political and economic demands grew for parity in places of
turmoil. During these difficult decades, Arunachal Pradesh moved
peacefully from being a Tract under the Assam governor’s jurisdiction to
the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), and finally became a state in
1987.
Sikkim merged with India in 1975, and in 2002, it became a part of
the North Eastern Council.
All the northeastern states along with Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir
and Himachal Pradesh got the ‘special’ tag. As a result of this, a
large amount of money began to flow into these states.
The Centre would grant 90% of the funds the ‘special status’ states
needed, while 10% were given as loans. In addition to this, when Atal
Bihari Vajpayee was the prime minister and Arun Shourie was the planning
minister, the first to hold charge of a new Northeast portfolio (then a
department, and not a ministry), a special offer was designed,
according to which every ministry would contribute 10% of its annual
budget to the Northeast department.
The money was to go to the non-lapsable central pool of resources in
the department, which was to become the ministry of DoNER (department of
the north-east region). It was the 14th Finance Commission that
recommended the ending of the ‘special status’ category and took out
provisions under Normal Central Assistance (NCA) and Special Central
Assistance (SCA). The chief ministers of the eight northeast states have
opposed this, saying that it would ‘drastically affect the finances in
the northeast states’ and objected to the fact that the Centre would no
longer make good the gap in non-plan revenue expenditure such as local
development projects and programmes.
A big worry of the states was that the large central subsidies that
were going into medium-term and long-term infrastructure programmes and
projects in these states (and quite likely into the pockets of the
contractors, officials, politicians and ‘militants’) would no longer
come for specific projects, but will be a part of a larger transfer. We
cannot forget that these states have a history of 30-50 years of
conflict. As a result of the violence, they have lost out on
opportunities for growth as well as innumerable lives and livelihoods.
The calculations of the Centre and the finance commission suffer from a fundamental flaw when it comes to Mizoram.
It’s
simple: The ’special category’ issue is one of the key provisions of
the 1986 landmark peace accord between the Mizo National Front (MNF) and
the Government of India as well as the local government. The agreement
has made Mizoram one of the most peaceful states in the country. In
Clause 6 of the Mizoram Accord’s Memorandum of Understanding, the status
is spelt out: (a) The Centre will transfer resources to the new
government … and this will include resources to cover the revenue gap
for the year, (b) Central assistance for Plan will be fixed taking note
of any residuary gap in resources …
The MNF, it may be recalled, revolted against India in 1966, and
received arms, funds and training from, and in China and Pakistan. The
Government of India’s response was nothing less than brutal, uprooting
two-thirds of the civilian population from their homes, burning villages
and settling them in new fenced-in protected villages or regrouping
centres. This remains one of the most undocumented and unresearched
parts of the Centre’s campaign in Mizoram. That both sides showed
courage and statesmanship to rise above the bitterness and bloodshed to
sign a peace treaty 20 years after the first shots were fired needs to
be recognised regularly. That the peace has been sustained for the
overall part for nearly 30 years is no mean achievement and has happened
because of the determination shown by a highly knowledgeable and
educated public, the church, the governments of different parties and
civil society.
This is to be underlined, especially when conditions in parts of
Manipur, Nagaland and Assam remain unsettled and unresolved. The latter
represents a different set of issues and stories, which we shall not
dwell upon here.
Anything that vitiates or dilutes the Mizoram Accord, the only peace
agreement to have held in more than a half century of conflict in the
northeast and which has been passed by Parliament, is unacceptable.
It is, therefore, heartening to note that the sub-committee of chief
ministers set up by the Niti Aayog has tabled a draft report saying that
for this category of states, the old formula should continue.
Changing the status would create new problems: The question will
surely be asked — what is the value of a peace accord if there isn’t an
economic dividend, let alone a political one? The Government of India
needs to firmly assert that the interests of Mizoram and its special
status compatriots will not be harmed.
Sanjoy Hazarika is director, Centre for Northeast studies at Jamia Millia Islamia University. The views expressed are personal.
