Naga Identity - Ideals, Parallels, and Reality

By Namrata Goswami

The Naga Hoho, the apex civil society body of the Nagas, while striving for a unified Naga identity, has been fighting a losing battle to bring about reconciliation among the several factions of Naga militias divided along tribal lines or factional loyalties that override ethnicity. The major challenge towards building a cohesive political unit is a fragmented identity engaged in internecine strife with bloodied consequences, which is in opposition to the larger Naga identity, says Namrata Goswami.

For Naga ethnic groups inhabiting the Naga Hills in the Indo-Myanmar trans-borders, the road to peace and prosperity lies in forging a common political Naga identity. There are several models the world over, both old and new, that could serve as examples on a comparable scale for political solidarity amongst geographically neighbouring people with similar but subtly varied cultures. Most of these cultures also are in disadvantageous juxtaposition due to external impositions of State administrations and territorial demarcations, with serious implications for the traditional homeland setup of these ethnic groups. In the past the formation of the Six Nations in North America, more recently the multinational struggle of the Kurds in the Middle East, nearer to home the evolution of the modern nation of Bhutan and currently the campaign for autonomy of Kachin neighbours of the Nagas are good instances of affiliated ethnic groups and tribal clans seeking common ground for collective political goals. The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) of the Kachins has a civilian-run extra-legal bureaucracy providing public services in Kachin State. Bhutan has several ethnic groups with one dominant group-controlled absolute monarchy. The country has recently made a successful transition from monarchy to a constitutional democracy. The Kurds of Kurdistan are currently a nation in the making in a trans-border conflict zone contiguous with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. In early American history, the Six Nations, also called the Iroquois, was a confederacy of different Native American ethnic groups. Today, this powerful super group has unified independent governance, and lives both in the United States and Canada.

As a historical illustration, in contrast to the success of the Iroquois was the Great Sioux Nation made up of several ethnic groups whose traditional homeland once spanned across thousands of square kilometres in the Great Plains of the U.S. and Canada. The Sioux being formidable warriors, but divided along group loyalties, lost a major chunk of their territories to the invading U.S. military, including the Black Hills, which are sacred grounds since ancient times for the Sioux and remains lost to them even today. The once proud peoples have been reduced to living in scattered reservations in the land of their ancestors. In 2007, a group of Sioux travelled to Washington DC to reassert their independence and sovereignty.

Naga Identity: Ideal versus Reality
The Naga Hoho, while being the apex civil society body of the Nagas striving for a unified Naga identity, has been fighting a losing battle bringing reconciliation to the several factions of Naga militias divided along tribal lines or factional loyalties, which override ethnicity.

Naga tribes in their ancestral homeland face the divisive international boundary between India and Myanmar as well as national administrative boundaries in both countries. However, much more than man-made lines on maps, the major challenge towards building a cohesive political unit is a fragmented identity engaged in internecine strife with bloodied consequences, which is in opposition to the larger Naga identity. As an illustration, the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) is an armed ethnic militia of the Zeliangrong Naga group consisting of the smaller Zeme, Liangmei and the Rongmei ethnic groups. Zeliangrong groups are spread over contiguous territories in Nagaland, Assam and Manipur States of India. The Zeliangrong territory is also the domain of other Naga faction rivals of the ZUF fighting for the Naga cause. There have been several incidents of encounters between these competing Naga militias vying to dominate the same geographical space inhabited by the Zeliangrong people, especially between the ZUF and National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak- Muivah faction [NSCN (I-M)].

Figure 1 - Major Naga Ethnic Groups' Areas

© Namrata Goswami
(Click here for a higher resolution image)

On the other end of the Naga identity spectrum is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang faction NSCN (K) headed by S. S. Khaplang, who is a Heimi Naga. The Heimi ethnic group belongs to the larger Tangsang Naga group including the Pangmi, Khaklak and Tangan ethnic groups spread over contiguous territories in Sagaing and Kachin States of Myanmar. In India, the Tangsang group consists of the Tangsa, Muklom and Tutsa in Arunachal Pradesh. The NSCN (K), with its headquarters in Myanmar, signed a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government in 2012. This faction holds sway over Nanyun and Lahe Townships in the Naga Self-Administered Zone, with a liaison office at Khampti town in Sagaing Region of Myanmar.

The Indian Government too has a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (K) since 2001, which has expanded its presence in Naga inhabited areas of India. Traditionally the NSCN (K) has been challenged in Naga inhabited areas of India by the NSCN (I-M). There have been numerous deadly clashes between these two NSCN factions in a fierce feud to dominate maximum Naga inhabited territory. As a few illustrations, a significant development starting in the early 2000s was the advent of NSCN (I-M) cadres into Arunachal Pradesh, originally the NSCN (K)’s backyard, turning the peaceful districts of Changlang, Tirap and the newly formed Longding into a battlefield. Both factions were fighting for dominance in Naga inhabited areas of the State, when in 2009 the NSCN (K) brought in their traditional ally, Myanmar’s heavily armed and battle hardened Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to take on the NSCN (I-M). The NSCN (K) also combined forces against the NSCN (I-M) with non-Naga militants like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur, both of whom have camps in NSCN (K) active areas in Arunachal Pradesh and bordering the Naga Self-Administered Zone, Myanmar. In 2006, the internecine feud between the NSCN factions took an unprecedented turn when the NSCN (K) issued ‘quit notices’ to all Tangkhuls in Nagaland, accusing that ethnic group of ‘masterminding terrorism against the NSCN (meaning the Khaplang faction) and innocent Nagas’.¹

Members of the Tangkhul ethnic group from Manipur are exclusive cadres of NSCN (I-M) and with this move the NSCN (K) was attempting to deny Naga affiliation of the Tangkhuls.

Figure 2 - Areas of the operations of the NSCN factions

© Namrata Goswami
(Click here for a higher resolution image)

The biggest blow to the NSCN (K)’s pan Naga influence in India came with the formation of the NSCN-Khole Kitovi (NSCN-KK) faction on June 7, 2011. The faction was formed by a dissenting group of cadres and their leaders, Khole Konyak and Kitovi Zhimoni, from the NSCN (K). Khole Konyak is from the Konyak ethnic group, the largest amongst the Nagas of Nagaland State. An interesting fact is that the Konyaks are the dominant group in contiguous Lahe Township, headquarters of the Naga Self-Administered Zone in Myanmar and also inhabit Khampti Township of Sagaing Division in Myanmar (See Figure I). Kitovi Zhimoni is a Sumi Naga who are numerous in Nagaland. Since both the NSCN (K) and NSCN (KK) occupy the same ethnic territories, there are bitter and deadly shooting incidents/encounters between the two splinter factions for military dominance. However, presently, the NSCN (KK) are focused on the current boundaries of Nagaland with the goal of pushing out and limiting the NSCN (K) to being a diminished Myanmar based outfit.
Figure 3 - NSCN (I-M)'s claimed Nagalim


© Namrata Goswami
(Click here for a higher resolution image)
NSCN (I-M)’s Nagalim i.e. the lofty goal of an independent ‘Greater Nagaland’ encompasses large swathes of contiguous territory inhabited by both Naga and non-Naga ethnic groups in India and Myanmar. In Myanmar, major chunks of claimed areas have mixed Naga and other ethnic groups populations. Tanai Township in Kachin State have several Naga villages along with the Kachins. Even Khampti Township, which was earlier headquarters of the ‘Burma Naga Hills District,’ have a sizeable minority of Nagas living with Bamar, Shans, Chinese and Indians. Other ‘Naga towns’ like Homalin, inhabited by fewer Nagas, are dominated by Bamar, Shans, Chin, Chinese and Indians. The NSCN (I-M) has not been active in Myanmar to press their claims of Nagalim after a declared ‘unilateral ceasefire’ with the Myanmar government.

The Nagalim territorial claims in India include large strips of territory peripheral to Naga inhabited areas, which have minuscule Naga populations as in Assam’s Cachar, Nagaon, Golaghat, Jorhat, Dibrugarh and Dhemaji districts. In Dima Hasao (formerly North Cachar Hills) district, Nagas are a sizeable minority and a small minority in Karbi Anglong district of Assam. Arunachal Pradesh’s Lohit, Anjaw, Dibang Valley, Lower Dibang Valley and Upper Siang districts are inhabited by ethnic groups such as the Adi, Mishmi, Zekhring, Khampti, Deori, Monpa, Memba, Tai Ahom, Singpho, Chakma and Tibetans, with distinctive identities bearing no affiliation to Naga ethnicity. The NSCN (I-M) however, has been actively engaged in endeavours to expand its influence to all Naga inhabited areas of India as well as mentoring other non-Naga insurgencies of northeast India in a sort of titular ‘mother of all insurgencies’ role.

The leaders of the NSCN (I-M) are Thuingaleng Muivah who is a Tangkhul Naga and Isak Chishi Swu who is a Sumi Naga, both from two of the larger Naga ethnic groups (see Figure 1). The Tangkhul Nagas form a large ethnic group in Manipur and adjoining areas of Sagaing, Myanmar where they are called Somra Nagas. Tangkhuls are the mainstay of the NSCN (I-M) and have taken the faction’s fight to faraway operational zones like Arunachal Pradesh.

However certain major incidents illustrate the complex nature of the ethnocentric support for the NSCN (I-M). In December 2013, the Sumi Nagas of Nagaland threatened to evict the NSCN (I-M) from their lands. The incident was triggered by the attempted rape and molestation of two Sumi women and the grievous injuring of two Sumi men who were all travelling to Zunheboto town. Their vehicle was allegedly waylaid by four armed cadres of the NSCN (I-M) who perpetrated these actions. The Sumis were further incensed by the failure of the NSCN (I-M) to later hand over the culprits hiding inside the guarded designated camp, instead attempting to compromise with the Sumi Hoho and even ‘pay off’ the victims to silence them.

In 2010 the NSCN (I-M)’s General Secretary Th. Muivah made abortive attempts to visit his native village in Manipur. These visits were stiffly opposed by the Manipur State government as earlier ones had triggered violence in Naga inhabited areas of the State. The NSCN (I-M)’s inclusion of Naga inhabited areas of Manipur into Nagalim evokes a deeply resentful response from the Meiteis for whom the issue is very sensitive.

The complexity of ethnic boundaries, as has been illustrated above, forced divisions of ethnic communities inhabiting the border areas of India and Myanmar by the imposition of an arbitrary international boundary with little regard to local realities, and the framework of policy-making that views ethnic groups as somehow pre-modern and in need of development are the major existential and ideational challenges. Inherent in this framework is a notion that somehow, the so called mainstream culture and institutions are themselves not ethnically slanted but universal.² In this scenario, policy making is propelled by the ‘command culture of legitimacy’ that the public administrators espouse, especially in dealing with minority communities, which can backfire. Consequently, what is required, and which has not been developed yet, is a deep seated understanding of the culture of identity recognition and preservation. Most importantly, since negotiations with armed groups in the Northeast are conducted in a scenario of threat, it is important to understand this framework so that there are no false expectations.³

The challenge for armed groups like the NSCN (I-M), NSCN (K), and NSCN (KK) is to meet the claim of representation of a common Naga identity and community, already run asunder by the territorial divisions brought about by a modern state mechanism as well as by the internecine clan/tribe-based fights that threaten the notion of common ethnic identity. Only time will tell whether, like the Great Iroquois, the Nagas can form a common supra-national/transnational structure that provides a common platform to their way of life and traditions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

References:
¹For more, see “NSCN-K Quit Notice”, The Telegraph, January 30, 2007, at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070130/asp/frontpage/story_7324330.asp (Last accessed on June 14, 2014).
²For more on this, please see Wsevolod W. Isajiw, “Approaches to Ethnic Conflict Resolution: Paradigms and Principles”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 24 (2000), pp. 105-124.
³Ibid

(Dr. Namrata Goswami is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, D.C., and a Fulbright-Nehru Senior Fellowship recipient in 2012-2013. The views expressed in this article are solely that of the author.)

A Few Minutes With The Iron Lady Of India

By Ravi Nitesh

An interaction with the world’s longest hunger striker
















































It was a meeting, an interaction with not a celebrity, neither any famous educationist, nor a politician, but for me, it was more than that. It was an interaction wherein I found that she is not an educationist, but is a subject of research papers and that her life itself is a source of learning. I found that she is not a politician, but her fight was such that it became one of the very important political movements. I found that she is not a celebrity but people were fascinated with her, media wanted to click her and the police surrounded her. Afterall, it was the case of World’s longest hunger striker who has been on a hunger-strike since last 14 years in the Manipur state of India with the demand to repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act or AFSPA.

AFSPA is a special act that empowers the armed forces of India with an extraordinary power when they operate in a conflict area where AFSPA is imposed. These extraordinary powers include the right to shoot, torture on mere suspicion and arrest without warrant. The forces are also empowered with legal impunity. No offence can be registered without any prior approval of central government. This act has led to extra-judicial killings, rapes, kidnapping, torture and fake encounters by security forces but not a single permission was ever given by the Government of India to prosecute any army personals.

In protest against the havoc created by AFSPA, in 2000, Irom Chanu Sharmila decided to sit on a hunger-strike against AFSPA for a day in the hope that the Government that will listen to her. Today, she is in her 14th year of hunger-strike. Yet, her faith has remained unshaken. She is hopeful that the Government will listen to her. As her supporter, I have not only admired her but have been deeply amazed and inspired by her relentless faith and determination. Even after 14 years of awaiting justice, even with health problems, she remains strong and determined. It has always been a mystery to me and it was this one thing that I took with me when I got the privilege to interact with her.

Throughout the interaction, she had a smiling face. She resonated positivity and calmness. She was soft-spoken but her determination was powerful even in her words.

She had started her talk with the story of King Ashoka who as a warrior had fought many kings but had became tearful and sensitive after the Kalinga war which had claimed thousands of lives. He had become so moved that he had renounced war and had started working for peace. She hoped that the Government may also become like Ashoka. She expressed her hope that the Government will also realize. They will improve themselves. They will understand that war/violence is never the solution.

Since her demand to repeal of AFSPA is shown as confined to Manipur, I inquired about it and she said that AFSPA is an inhuman law and it does not deserve to be in any region. On my question that what will you do if the government will be agreed to lift it from Manipur but not from J&K. She remarked (with smile), “Let them lift from Manipur first and then they must do it from all other states including Jammu and Kashmir”.

On asking that what keeps her going? What has motivated her to have continued their struggle for so long? She smiled and replied, “conscience”. Her conscience doesn’t allow her to see this injustice. She refuted the claim that she is committing suicide. She remarked that she loves life.

I was moved by her simplicity. She is a simple person and in that simplicity, lies her strength. She has been awaiting justice even though she was never a direct victim. She was not a political activist yet she decided to devote her life for justice. She was not doing it for any reason, any political motive but for humanity. She decided to fight because she wanted that everyone should have the right to justice. Everyone should possess the same rights. She is an ordinary citizen, she said, but with a conscience.

Ravi Nitesh is a Petroleum Engineer, Founder- Mission Bhartiyam, Core Member- Save Sharmila Solidarity Campaign

follow on twitter: www.twitter.com/ravinitesh Blog: www.ravinitesh.blogspot.com

Photo By Ravi Nitesh

Source: Countercurrents.org

World-Class Training Facilities in The Northeast Will Help Football in India

By Rajdeep Sardesai

Forget power cuts, ‘Ache din’ are here for the Indian sports fan. Over the next few weeks, the world will be tied into football fever. We will be dazzled by the artistry of a Messi and Ronaldo; fans in Kolkata will wear Brazilian shirts; pubs in Mumbai will have special screenings; and life in Goa and Kerala will revolve around a ball. We will celebrate the spirit of the beautiful game even as the national team won’t be playing it yet again.

In the 84-year history of the event, we have not participated in the World Cup finals even once. We almost did in 1950, coincidentally also hosted by Brazil, but had to withdraw because we were not allowed to play barefoot. The 1950s and early 60s are perhaps the golden age of Indian soccer: We won the gold at the inaugural Asian Games in 1951, repeated our success in 1962, and finished fourth in the Melbourne Olympics in 1956.

Recent years have been sadly more difficult for the Indian football team. We are ranked 154th in the world (Pakistan is ranked 169th, which may provide consolation to some); we lost the South Asian football title last year to Afghanistan and even struggled to beat tiny Maldives. While another pint sized country like Honduras will participate in the World Cup, our best hope of actually being in the finals may lie in hosting the tournament one day.

Ironically, there is some evidence to suggest that interest in the sport itself has never been higher. Television ratings of global football games, especially the English Premier League, are steadily climbing. There is, in fact, more ‘live’ football now than ever before on Indian television. The inter-club tournament is being supplemented by an IPL style football league later this year. The World Inter-club tournament will be hosted by India in 2017 as will a global junior tournament.

The sport has also moved beyond its traditional powerhouses — West Bengal, Kerala and Goa — and discovered fresh catchment areas. Nowhere is the craze for football more visible than in the North-East. Mizoram, quite remarkably, won the national Santosh Trophy this year; clubs like Lajong FC in Shillong have made a mark in top events; and Baichung Bhutia has stirred a football mini-revolution in his home state of Sikkim. And yet, why is the glass of Indian football so painfully half-empty? Why is the world’s only genuine mass game unable to take a great leap forward among the wider masses in the country?

The obvious answer must lie in our near-fatal obsession with cricket. When one sport so overwhelmingly dominates our lives, then what chance for any other sport to survive and prosper? Our original national game, hockey, has already been pushed to the margins, so what hope did football, not blessed with the same golden traditions, ever have? Cricket monopolises talent, resources and attention, leaving us perilously close to being seen as a one-sport nation, although recent successes in the Olympics in individual sports like shooting, badminton and wrestling have offered some respite.

And yet, to blame cricket for the woes of other Indian sports is self-defeating. The fact is, games like football have wallowed in mediocrity for much too long. Kolkatans, for example, have remained content in the battles between Mohun Bagan and East Bengal, almost mirroring the plight of a state being left behind by the rest. Kerala too never looked to raise the bar of the sport. Is it merely a coincidence that the Left, which has often looked at sport as an elite luxury, ruled Kerala and Bengal for years?

The solution doesn’t lie in simply getting more foreign players to participate in domestic leagues. Nor will it change by bringing IPL-style glamour into the sport with the likes of Ranbir Kapoor and John Abraham now owning football teams. It won’t change by merely showing more of the sport on television either. In fact, the telecast of global football leagues only underscores the difference between the rest of the world and us.

The key to the future then is two-fold. First, we need to recognise that football requires special physical attributes that are ill-suited to many parts of the country. What countries like Japan and South Korea have shown though is that raw power alone doesn’t win you football games; there is space for speed and quick reflexes. The footballers of the North-East are uniquely blessed in this regard. A focussed programme of football academies and world-class training aimed at this part of the country will have the most direct impact on our football. If Haryana could throw up India’s wrestling heroes, why can’t the North-East produce an assembly line of quality footballers? And why can’t business houses take this up as a challenge and part of corporate social responsibility for an oft-neglected region?

The other long-term solution lies in simply giving our children a chance to play. Per capita playgrounds in this country are among the lowest in the world. We shrink open spaces in our cities and have schools without sports grounds, and yet expect to produce international athletes. Cricket is an exception because there is an eco-system that now rewards excellence; for the rest, there is little chance of growth without infrastructure.

In Mumbai, for example, the Shiv Sena has now proposed to convert the 225 acre Race Course in the heart of the city into a theme park. The idea isn’t bad: A city like Mumbai needs more green lungs for its common citizens to enjoy rather than retain it as a privilege for Turf Club members. A space for people to walk, and maybe for our children to just kick a ball, isn’t that a way to a healthier and more ‘sporty’ future?

Post-script: Since the football World Cup doesn’t evoke the nationalist passions that cricket does, I am, like many Goans, seeking refuge in our colonial past. Portugal and Brazil are my teams for the Cup!

Rajdeep Sardesai is editor-in-chief, IBN 18 network

North East Energy For Bangladesh – Analysis

The Indian prime minister’s overtures to SAARC countries are an opportunity for India and Bangladesh to enhance an energy partnership. Intensified exchanges will benefit both: India’s North East, rich in energy sources, will get investments while Bangladesh, a ready market, can improve its energy security


By Amit Bhandari

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiative of inviting SAARC heads of state for his swearing-in ceremony on May 26 is an opportunity to deepen India’s ties with its closest neighbours. But it is especially an opportunity to expand the growing engagement with Bangladesh in the energy sector.
Both the countries can gain in the process—Bangladesh can address its growing energy and fuel needs as well as lower its energy costs. In turn, India will gain from increased economic activity in the north eastern states, which are rich in reserves of coal, oil, gas and hydropower and can become an energy source for Bangladesh.

Bangladesh relies on domestically produced natural gas to meet almost 75% of its energy consumption. The rest is made up by approximately 20% oil and 5% coal.1 However, the country is now facing a shortage of domestically produced natural gas.2 As a result, it has set up power plants that run on imported furnace oil and diesel, both of which are very expensive options.3
Domestic oil production is minimal and petroleum products are almost entirely imported. The country has its own coal deposits, estimated to be 3.3 billion tonnes spread over five reserves. But it produces only 1 million tonnes of coal per annum because not all of the coal can be mined in a commercially viable manner.

Only one of the five reserves has been brought into production so far, where the coal seams are closest to the surface, at approximately 118-509 metres. The other reserves are at much greater depths, starting at 300 metres. The largest of these, with approximately 1 billion tonnes, is at a depth of over 600 metres, which makes it unviable to mine.

Derated capacity of BPDB plants, June 2014

	Capacity (mw)	% of total
Coal	200	2.04
Furnace oil	52	0.53
Gas	6,224	63.62
Heavy fuel oil	1,926	19.69
High speed diesel	661	6.76
Hydro	220	2.25
Imported	500	5.11
Total	9,783	100

Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB)

Therefore, Bangladesh has its task cut out on the energy front. It must produce more gas and this requires more efforts in exploration. It will also have to shift from expensive furnace oil and diesel to the relatively cheaper coal-burning power plants. Until then, it will have to continue to import power and coal to address current shortages.

India is already involved in supporting Bangladesh in all three areas: exploring for oil and natural gas; building more coal-based power plants; and importing power and coal.

For natural gas, a 50-50 joint venture of India’s upstream petroleum companies, ONGC and Oil India, has been awarded two shallow water blocks off the Bangladesh coast. A production-sharing contract with state-owned Petrobangla has also been signed. 5

For coal plants, India’s public sector National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) is developing a 1,320 mw coal fired power plant in Bagerhat district of Bangladesh in a 50-50 joint venture with the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB). This project is expected to be complete by 2018 and BPDB will purchase its output for 25 years.

India exports a small quantity of coal to Bangladesh (approximately 1.5 million tonnes) and exports 475 mw of electricity to Bangladesh, from Tripura.

But more can be done, specifically with petroleum products, to benefit both the countries. Bangladesh imports crude oil as well as refined petroleum products such as diesel and petrol. Most of Bangladesh’s petro-products currently come from Malaysia and Singapore. During 2012-13, Bangladesh imported petroleum products worth only $138 million from India, while imports from Malaysia and Singapore added up to $1,362 million.

India is already a major exporter of such products. Its four oil refineries in Assam have the capacity to produce 7 million tonnes of petroleum products. The consumption of petroleum products in the seven north eastern states is only 2.88 million tonnes.10 Exporting petroleum products from Assam to Bangladesh via a pipeline makes economic sense for both sides: it is cheaper than moving them by ship, as is currently done by Bangladesh. This will lower the logistics cost for Bangladesh. For India, it will be cheaper to pipe these products to Bangladesh than to transport them to other Indian or overseas markets.

The largest and most modern of the Assam refineries is the government-owned 3 million tonne Numaligarh Refinery Limited (NRL). NRL is planning to expand from its current capacity to 8-9 million tones. The expansion will be financially unviable without additional markets. The company is already exploring the possibility of a pipeline from Siliguri in West Bengal to Bangladesh.11 While such a project will make commercial sense, the decision and its progress and execution depend on the willingness of governments to work together.

Such an overture can even catalyse other economic gains for India, such as improved access to the north eastern states if Bangladesh allows transit rights. This has already happened in a limited way in the energy sector in Tripura. The state has gas reserves with limited local use, and transporting them to other parts of India is not feasible. Converting the gas into electricity and transmitting it via power lines is easier. To enable construction of ONGC Tripura Power Company’s 720 mw power project that runs on natural gas, Bangladesh permitted movement of equipment through its territory.12 It is this power plant that is exporting a large portion of its output to Bangladesh.

The Tripura power company is just one example of how mutually beneficial opportunities can be tapped if the two countries work together. This can be repeated across other links of the energy chain.

Amit Bhandari is Fellow, Energy & Environment Studies, Gateway House.
This article was published at Gateway House and is reprinted with permission.
References:
1. British Petroleum. BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

2. Petrobangla.Petrobangla: Annual Report 2012.
p. 8.
3. Bangladesh Power Development Board. Power Generation Units (Fuel Type Wise).

4. Energy and Mineral Resources Division: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Energy and Mineral Resources Division.

5. ONGC Videsh Limited. ONGC Videsh and Oil India signs Production Sharing Contract for Two Shallow water Exploration Blocks in Bangladesh.

6. Lok Sabha. Agreement between India and Bangladesh.

7. Lok Sabha. Export of Coal.

8. Lok Sabha. Export of power to Bangladesh.

9. Bangladesh Bank. Annual Review of Import payments 2012-13.
(accessed June 1, 2014) pp. 26 – 32.
10. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India. Indian Petroleum & Natural Gas Statistics 2012-13.

11. Numaligarh Refinery Limited. Annual Report 2012-13.
pp. 30.
12. ONGC. Annual Report 2011-12.

Can Rape Ever Be Right?

By Magda Mis

Members of the All Assam Photojournalist Association wear black sashes over their mouths at a protest against the rape of a photojournalist by five men in an abandoned textile mill in Mumbai. Picture Guwahati, northeast India, August 24, 2013. REUTERS/Utpal Baruah

Shocking as it may be, there are men who think rape is OK. There are women, too, who believe it’s the victims who should be blamed for the crime.

Is downplaying rape by debating whether it’s right or wrong or diverting blame from the perpetrator to the victim just a harmless talk shop, or can it have more serious implications? Can it perhaps send potential offenders the false message that “everybody makes mistakes” and that rape can sometimes be an accident caused by the victim and therefore excused?

On Thursday Indian ruling party politician Babulal Gaur declared that rape “sometimes is right, sometimes is wrong”. For Gaur rape is a “social crime” that doesn’t even take place unless reported to police.

A bit like saying a person is not dead unless a death certificate is produced.

Another politician, Poland’s Janusz Korwin-Mikke, said he didn’t really understand what rape was.
“Raped, what does it mean, raped?” he asked during a television debate in May. "Women are always pretending that they are showing some resistance and this is normal. One has to know when one can and when one can't," he said.

A number of men insist, like Korwin-Mikke, that they are getting confused signals from women; as a result some feel perfectly entitled to have sex with them without making sure this is what they want.

A Guardian article described a man accused by a woman of raping her. He had had sex with her while she was asleep and had felt for some time previously that she was giving him the strong impression that she wanted to have sex with him.

However, just as it’s not only women who are victims of rape, it’s not only men who downplay the crime.

A widely publicised gang rape committed on a 23-year-old student in India two years ago prompted a comment from a female Indian party leader, Asha Mirje, accusing rape victims themselves of inviting the crime.

"Rapes take place also because of a woman's clothes, her behaviour and her presence at inappropriate places," said Mirje.

But is it really relevant what women are wearing, where they are, how they are behaving? In other words, can rape ever be excused because the perpetrator believed the victim “invited” the crime? Or, in Babulal Gaur’s words, can rape ever be “right”?

Another politician, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, clearly disagrees:

"I can't say often enough it doesn't matter what coat she was wearing, whether she drank too much, whether it was in the back of a car, in her room, on the street, it does not matter. It does not matter if she initially said yes and changed her mind and said no. No means no, wherever it is stated," Biden said at the launch of a White House report on preventing rape and sexual violence in colleges.

It doesn’t matter what the perpetrator’s excuse is: rape means forcibly executed sexual intercourse. Rape means violence.

I was stunned when, during research for this blog, I typed “rape victims” and Google’s only auto-complete suggestion was “rape victims crime scene photos.”

The sad reality is not only that some people say they don’t know what rape is and others think the victims are to blame. Or that somebody would feed their sick curiosity by looking at pictures from rape crime scenes.

What is perhaps more alarming is that there are people who trivialise rape, who do not see as it really is: a serious crime which should not be played down under any circumstances.

As Biden said: "No man has a right under any circumstance other than self defense, no man has a right ever to raise his hand to a woman, period, end of story. It is assault, if they do".

Polish prosecutors are investigating whether Korwin-Mikke’s comments warrant prosecution for incitement to rape, and rightly so.

Maybe if more people think before they speak and stop playing down the fact that rape is a serious crime, then perhaps others will start understanding the consequences of their behaviour and stop before it’s too late.

There is no room for debating whether rape can be right or wrong. It is an act of violence and it’s always wrong.

The North-Eastern Challenge

By Sanjoy Hazarika

In a region like the North-east, where few groups actually constitute a numerical majority, the State has been involved in unending and fatiguing efforts to deal with a cycle of demands and counter-demands

The recent attacks and killings in Assam, Manipur and Meghalaya by armed non-State groups represent a challenge and test for the Narendra Modi government and the need to understand the frustrating complexities of the North-eastern region.

Things are not being made easy after strident demands by the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party MPs from Assam to rid the State of “Bangladeshis,” a phrase that many from the minority community say is aimed at targeting them, irrespective of nationality, and one that can swiftly turn into a security nightmare not just for governments in Delhi and Dispur, but also for ordinary people caught up in a storm. For a moment, the “Bangladeshi” issue has moved away from the headlines because of other events that have captured public attention.

A Superintendent of Police in Assam’s Karbi Anglong district was shot dead when his tiny unit was engaged in a fight with an armed group wanting a separate state for the Karbi community in the jungles of Assam’s eastern hills — the second major setback that the police in the State have suffered, an Additional Superintendent having fallen earlier to the bullets of an armed faction from the Bodo tribe.

Some 400 kilometres west of Karbi Anglong, blurred images emerge of a woman who was executed gangland style execution after she resisted rape by men from the “Garo National Liberation Army” in Meghalaya. The GNLA was launched five years back by a former police officer, who is now in police custody. But the group is still active, extorting funds, and carrying out strikes against security forces and civilians.

Rise of insurgent factions

The law and order situation in the Garo Hills, the home district of Meghalaya Chief Minister Mukul Sangma, is such that a top official says that his men could not have moved to the village of the murdered woman at night as they got word of a possible attack on police convoys. They got the news when the woman’s family walked into a police station and told them what had happened. This is a poor reflection of police capacity, underscoring the need for better equipment as well as strong political leadership.

These issues underline both the ethnic and social complexity of the North-eastern region, home to over 200 ethnic communities, as well as how political mobilisation and armed violence have changed in these past years. While the principal militant factions have been sitting at the negotiating table with New Delhi or in “designated camps” for years, be it the Nagas, Assamese, Karbis, Bodos and Garos, they are being sharply challenged by smaller, more violent, breakaway factions.

Armed with new weapons which are easily available in the illegal small arms markets in the region, combined with new technology and better connectivity, these groups are demonstrating the seamless manner in which they can move across State borders.

The level of violence is especially stark when contrasted with the extraordinary beauty of the countryside across all States, although the towns and cities, as elsewhere, are turning into ugly urban sprawls. The Bodo-Muslim riots in 2012, which displaced nearly half a million people, and the incident earlier this year when over 30 men, women and children were butchered by armed men in the Bodo areas are examples of such violence. All the victims this time were Muslim and the resonance of public anger — of minority as well as non-Muslim, non-Bodo groups — was visible in the overwhelming victory of a non-Bodo candidate in a Lok Sabha constituency.

Amid this fabric, what is often forgotten is the chain of interconnected events and the contemporary political narrative: thus, in the Bodo Territorial Council areas, the first attacks on Muslim and other groups took place in the Bodo areas in 1993. Earlier, few such incidents were reported. There were tensions over land issues but these had not spiralled into the bloodshed that followed later.

There is another process that the Modi government will be aware of — that of manufactured consent. In a region like the North-east, where few groups actually constitute a numerical majority — one is not speaking on religious but ethnic grounds here — the State has been involved in unending and fatiguing efforts to deal with a cycle of demands, counter-demands, agitations and resolutions. This has dominated the political discourse in the region. Thus, almost every State experiencing conflict is witness to a non-violent process by a group demanding greater powers — such as for a community or group of communities, putting forth an overall set of political demands such as greater autonomy or a separate State. Yet, this runs almost in parallel with violent movements for, ironically, either similar demands or, going a step further, for “independence.”

This began with the Naga movement in the 1950s and spread to the Mizo Hills, Manipur, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya, although in the latter, armed movements rose against their own State governments in the 1990s.

In almost every movement, “outsiders” have been targeted — whether it is those from another State, of a different linguistic or ethnic group or the so-called “Bangladeshis.” Yet, today, in almost every State, major armed organisations which have thrown challenges to Delhi over the past six decades have abandoned the gun and are either negotiating with the Centre or engaging in ceasefire. The most visible sign of this was the landslide victory of a former leader of the United Liberation Front of Assam from the Bodo areas. He crushed the official Bodo candidate in the Lok Sabha election and took his oath of allegiance to the Constitution in Parliament — the very Constitution against which he had taken up arms earlier.

Yet, agreements and semi-agreements have been the pattern in the region. These have a history of spawning breakaway groups which claim to be “anti-talks,” yet want to be at the table with the big boys; they hit hard at easy targets, showing the difficulties that police and other forces face in moving through difficult terrain. The smaller groups too want a share of the funds flowing into the region and the power that goes with it.

Political will is critical to dealing with this. Small States like Meghalaya have been adversely hit by the disinclination of both government and Opposition leaders in taking a tough line on the “boys” in the Garo Hills. Earlier Chief Ministers had demonstrated political courage, authorising crackdowns that forced Khasi and Garo groups to the negotiating table. It is also not a mere coincidence that the armed groups concentrate on the coal-rich areas of the Garo Hills where extraction is highly profitable and where prominent political figures are said to have business interests.

Thus, a pattern has emerged over the past decades — New Delhi, to use a BJP catchphrase, has always tried to appease the largest group agitating or fighting for a cause or one which is prepared to talk. It has not tried to resolve the core issue or issues which involve a broader and deeper dialogue with other groups, and with non-government and civil society figures, scholars and organisations. Without that kind of work, through mediators and counsellors, no agreement can work or last.

Perhaps Delhi thinks it is just a matter of being politically “realistic” — but such realism has backfired time and again. This was most evident during the standoff between Telangana and Andhra.

And the North-east, with its many divergent and parallel ethnic mobilisation processes, is a far more difficult place. This then is the problem with what one could call “manufactured comfortable consent” — such agreements rarely last,for they are designed for short-term gains such as placating a demand, winning an election, creating a new elite and giving the government some breathing space. Often, the agitators are not as representative as they claim to be.

Focus therefore is of the essence, and not haste.

No to rights abuse

The Centre should not be diverted by recent events and instead concentrate on speeding up the prolonged Naga negotiations (now on for nearly 18 years). The Delhi-Naga talks do not even have an official negotiator as former Nagaland Chief Secretary Raghaw Pandey quit before the election to join the BJP but did not get a nomination. Other negotiations also need to be pursued with vigour and vision.

The Modi government must send a clear and unambiguous message to its members and followers that they cannot take law into their hands over the issue of “Bangladeshis.” This could spread fear, tension, mistrust and worse in Assam. Due process must be followed — otherwise there is acute danger of violence, tragedy and abuse of human rights just because of a person’s religion. Isn’t the Pune murder of the young Muslim techie by Hindu thugs a warning and wake-up call? The media must play a sober role in this because definitions of “Bangladeshis” are often blurred and arbitrary.

We need to abide by the recent judgment in the Meghalaya High Court which, while stating the obvious, defined a Bangladeshi as someone who came to India after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Many tend to look at much earlier cut off dates in their search for “illegal migrants.”

New Delhi needs to inform all State governments in the region — whichever the party — that the murder of innocents, of whichever ethnicity, religion or language group, and the abuse of rights by armed groups (or security forces) and local thugs is unacceptable. Such violations need to be met with a cabrated robust response aimed at showing results in a specific time frame.

(Sanjoy Hazarika is director of the Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.)

Railways Must Look East

By SN Mathur

In the highly competitive world economy of today, transport cost is a significant determinant of competitiveness, which makes an efficient surface transport network a concomitant for better economic integration. Somehow, the surface transport networks in several parts of Asia continue to be fragmented, and consequently their potential as instruments of economic growth at the regional level has not been fully realised.

The idea of linking the railway networks of Asia, to provide international connections—not only between the region’s countries but also with the Middle Eastern and European systems—was first expressed in the ’60s by initiating the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) project. The objective was to shorten transit times between nations and regions and serve as a tool for their economic growth through expansion of international trade. Besides, because transporting goods by rail is faster than through the sea, rail connectivity was expected to reduce transport cost substantially. Rail can also carry a much higher volume of freight traffic than road.

The TAR envisages the creation of an integrated freight railway network across Europe and Asia. When the idea was conceived, the objective was to provide a continuous 14,000km rail link between Singapore and Istanbul, with possible onward links to Europe and Africa. Today, the network has about 81,000km of rail routes—the 12,600km Southeast Asia corridor, the 32,500km Northeast Asia corridor, the 13,200km Central Asia and Caucasus corridor and the 22,600km South Asia-Iran-Turkey corridor—and connects 28 countries.

In a major policy decision, the Indian Railways has agreed to participate in the TAR link between Europe and Southeast Asia. The project, being considered by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific under the Asian Land Infrastructure Development Project, will help identify and evaluate the development and operation of a network of routes between South Asia and Europe. The routes are supposed to run via Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The growth of international trade, continued surge of containerised freight through the ports of Asia-Pacific and the recognition of greater regional integration are encouraging countries to seek efficient connectivity through transport networks. It provides the railways of the region an opportunity to upgrade their existing infrastructure with the aim of defining and operating international corridors.

With this in mind, the countries involved decided to define a framework within which they can discuss and plan the future expansion and operation of the Trans-Asian Railway Network. The Ministerial Conference on Transport held in Korea in 2006 adopted a Regional Action Programme for Transport Development in Asia and the Pacific. It aimed to promote an integrated approach to transport planning with a view to facilitating efficient logistics in the region. Accordingly, 18 member states signed the inter-governmental agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network that formalises the coordinated development of TAR. Other countries, including India, signed the agreement in the subsequent years. It envisages completion of the ambitious project by 2025.

The economies of south and Southeast Asia have been growing rapidly due to easing of trade barriers, increase in foreign direct investment and greater integration with the global economy. However, intra-regional trade and investment has been relatively limited because of various bottlenecks in trade infrastructure. Increased connectivity between the two sub-regions can help improve industrial efficiency and productivity, expanding the market size and ensuring long-term economic prosperity.

India has demonstrated its economic and technological capabilities for further integration with the regional and global economy. Myanmar being the only land bridge between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations and India, its importance as a regional logistics and trading hub cannot be overstated. Rail connectivity between India and Myanmar is completely absent. Indian Railways has, therefore, agreed to build a 350km route between India and Myanmar, which will require about `3,000 crore, part of which will be borne by Myanmar. In the first phase it will take up construction of 97km new rail connection between Jiribam and Tupul (Manipur) costing `728 crore. Later, this link will be extended to Moreh inside Myanmar territory. These links would eventually be integrated into the proposed Trans-Asian Railway Network.

With the construction of a rail corridor between India and Myanmar, India will be linked by rail to Southeast Asia, and eventually to China, its largest trading partner in Asia, registering about $ 60 billion worth of trade last year alone. The recent political reform process in Myanmar now makes possible rail and road connectivity between south and Southeast Asia that did not appear feasible a few years ago. The implementation of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement has further facilitated intra-regional trade and investment liberalisation. It is particularly important in the context of India’s Look East policy which cannot be operationalised without the participation of the Northeast.

For various historical and political reasons, the Northeast has remained cut off from its economic and social ties with neighbouring Myanmar, Bangladesh and China, and has had to depend for almost all its supplies from mainland India only. The new rail connectivity, that shall be a part of the TAR network, will help transform the region’s economy, serving as a corridor for movement of raw material, semi-finished and finished products. It can also play a pivotal role in the development of commerce and cultural exchange with the Southeast Asian countries. Manipur can then become one of the key links not only between India and Myanmar but also between the whole of South Asia and Southeast Asia.

The new Indian government has realised the urgency of fast-tracking infrastructure development of the region by appointing a former Army chief to head the ministry of north east development. This will accelerate the progress of various projects incorporated in the North Eastern Region Vision Document 2020 aimed at promoting the flow of peoples and goods, expansion of communication networks, opening up of markets and generating employment.

The author is a former MD of Railway Finance Corporation.

E-mail: mathur.surendra@gmail.com

Why Was Myanmar’s President Not Invited to Modi’s Swearing-In Ceremony?

What this tells us about India’s policy toward Southeast Asia

By Akhilesh Pillalamarri

Prime Minister Narendra Modi broke new ground last Monday by inviting the leaders of “every nation on India’s periphery” to his swearing-in ceremony. These countries included all the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries as well as SAARC observer Mauritius. Even the Prime Minister in exile of Tibet was invited. Despite this impressive guest list, the leader of one of India’s neighbors, Myanmar, was not invited.

This fact is made all the more glaring because the omission of an invite seems to go against the new government’s desire to cultivate more substantial relations with its neighbors. India and Myanmar share a long 1,624-kilometer (1,009 mi) border. However, in all likelihood, the lack of an invite for Myanmar’s President Thein Sein was not a mistake or a deliberate omission, but simply something that was on nobody’s mind. Politicians and the media in both countries did not seem to expect that Myanmar would even be invited, as evidenced by the fact that the media in neither country made an issue out of Myanmar’s non-invite.

This is a function of how both countries view each other. Despite the fact that Myanmar is an observer in the SAARC, it does not have strong ties with South Asia and is more oriented towards Southeast Asia, where it is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  From the vantage point of New Delhi too, policy toward Myanmar is treated not through the lens of South Asian bonhomie but under the aegis of India’s Look East Policy. This lack of closeness may come as a surprise to some, but despite rhetoric about historical, cultural, and religious ties, Myanmar and India went different ways centuries ago with Myanmar drawing closer to Thailand and China. After the British conquest of Burma in the nineteenth century, what is today’s Myanmar was ruled as a province of British India but was separated and made an independent colony in 1937, largely at the demand of Burmese nationalists who did not identify with the nationalist Indian independence movement.

Relations with Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, will undoubtedly be given more priority in the upcoming few months. The previous Congress government unfortunately neglected India’s relations with its Asian neighbors, its elite English-speaking and Western-educated leaders seemingly forgetting that India is in fact in Asia and not in the West — a psychological orientation reflected in external policy. The Indian nationalist narrative reflected in BJP thinking is, on the other hand, more oriented towards Asia. To begin with, India will seek greater connectivity with Southeast Asia and land routes must necessarily pass through Myanmar. India has recently called for a bus route from Imphal in Northeastern India to Mandalay in Myanmar. Potentially more important is Myanmar’s location between India and China. Prime Minister Modi is especially keen on improving India’s lukewarm relations with China, which had experienced glacial progress under the previous government. Congress may have deliberately misinformed the public of the nature of India’s past interactions with China in order to create a sense of martyrdom to cover up for its failures during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. In a recent conversation with Modi, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang warmly suggested the construction of a Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor that would connect Kunming in China to India’s Northeast through Myanmar.

Such a connection to Myanmar, Southeast Asia, and China would be a boon to India’s much neglected Northeast region. Northeast India is significantly different from the rest of India in terms of languages, religion, culture, and even race and is in many ways more Southeast Asian than South Asian. Surrounded by Myanmar, China, and Bangladesh on almost all four sides and connected to the rest of India via only a narrow corridor, greater interconnectivity with international neighbors could bring this region much needed economic development and stem the dozens of insurgencies that have plagued the area for the past 60 years. That the Modi government means to improve the situation in Northeast India is clear by the appointment of a seasoned former general, Vijay Kumar (VK) Singh to the federal Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (MDONER). Singh is expected to infuse some much needed dynamism into the region.

The Modi government’s initial focus on its neighbors in South Asia is not at odds with improving relations with Southeast Asia. The Look East Policy was a cornerstone of the previous BJP government and in all likelihood will be given more importance under Modi, given his marked interest in pursuing stronger relations with his eastern neighbors. However, the Look East Policy makes more sense if it occurs in tandem with economic integration in South Asia, as it makes little sense for India to liberalize trade with Southeast Asian countries without pursuing a similar policy in its own backyard. This is why South Asia has been accorded the greater initial priority, especially since economic integration and bilateral trade in the region is currently miniscule.

Akhilesh Pillalamarri is an Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat.

India’s Low-Hanging Economic Fruit is in the East – the Northeast

By Col (Retd) Anil Athale

It is good that the verdict of the 2014 general elections is clear and not a fractured one like in 1996 or 1998. The new BJP Prime Minister will find an economy that is on the slide, unemployment on the rise, and security threats worsening due to the emergence of a new cold war, among other things. On top of it all are the heightened expectations of a young and restless population.


But the first challenge before the new PM is to restore the power and prestige of the office of the Prime Minister. The erosion in the authority of this office that took place over the last 10 years is unprecedented – something not seen even during the tenures of Deve Gowda and IK Gujral, who ran shaky minority governments.

This erosion happened because the PM chose to play second fiddle to the UPA chairperson. As any administrator knows, power comes from the ability to reward or punish. In the case of the outgoing government, the power of rewards was in the hands of Sonia Gandhi, who controlled even minor appointments in the central government and its offshoots.

These appointees owed their personal loyalties to the ‘family’ and not the PM. Is it any wonder that the PM was unable to implement almost any policy? In the days of monarchy, the sceptre represented the power of the king. Even in its democratic ‘avatar’, the speaker of Parliament sits in the shadow of a ‘mace’, or sceptre.

The outgoing government was guilty of letting the sceptre fall into the hands of an unconstitutional authority, thus destroying the cohesion of the executive.

Politics, by its very nature, abhors a vacuum. The power vacuum in UPA-2 was filled by the judiciary, the media and some NGOs. It is easy to blame the judiciary for usurping the policy-making functions of the executive, but it saw the crown lying in the dirt and used the mechanism of the PIL to pick it up. The media, especially 24-hour television, and foreign- funded NGOs, were not far behind. A new PM will have to first wrest back the power of decision-making from these arms of the state and none-state actors. The battle is going to be hard and dirty, so much so that the new PM may find that the just concluded election campaign was a picnic compared to what lies ahead! The problem is that the institutions that acquired this power (the judiciary or the media) got it without corresponding responsibility. So they will fight tooth-and-nail to retain their power.

But while the new government fights these battles and begins to implement much-needed changes and economic reforms, there are three doable, non-controversial policy decisions that can easily yield double-digit economic growth. An economic institute has estimated that each one point rise in GDP propels six million families out of poverty.

The three non-economic measures suggested here are capable of minimally raising GDP growth by one percentage point each! The trinity of measures are:

* Focus economic and foreign policy on the east. The west can wait.
* Re-orient defence policy and reorganise the vast defence machine.
* Prioritise ‘soft power’ export as a major foreign exchange earner and employment generator.

Sanjaya Baru’s book, The Accidental Prime Minister: The making and unmaking of Manmohan Singh, has one intriguing revelation. It says that the outgoing PM’s initiative on open trade with south-east Asia was stalled by Sonia Gandhi and her National Advisory Council (NAC). As someone who has been studying the north-east insurgencies for the last 25 years (including the last few years as the Chhattrapati Shivaji Fellow of the USI), one can say without contradiction that trade with Asean via the land borders of the north-east will save millions of taxpayer rupees by reducing subsidies, generating employment and ushering peace that in turn will reduce defence expenditure.

The first obvious step in this Look East policy is to look at our own North-East first. For instance, the Kaladan river project to connect Sittawe port in Myanmar with Mizoram has been in limbo for the last 30 years! The border connectivity at Moreh in Manipur is primitive with only headloads permitted to be carried across the border! Contrast this with the fanfare and attention given to our trade with Pakistan via the Wagah border or via Uri and Chiken Di Bagh in Kashmir. At the risk of sounding harsh, one can say that Indian foreign policy in the last decade was reduced to a Pakistan policy. Unfortunately for us, the fundamentals of the Pakistani ideology are such that any progress will be a mirage for a few generations.

The ground situation in the Indian North-East is extremely favourable for ending the insurgencies and unrest once and for all. There is a great yearning to join the Indian mainstream and progress economically. A bold initiative in the North-East and the opening up of trade with ASEAN can work wonders for the region as well as the national economy. India’s defence posture is one of the most inefficient and resource wasting postures in the world. Fundamentally, the defence apparatus is still stuck in the British model of ‘Garrison army and expeditionary force ‘. Defence planning, currently left to the armed forces, has become a collection of worst-case-scenarios and their aggregation.

Modernisation has come to mean junior officers in the War Establishment directorate leafing through glossy defence magazines and forwarding demands for the import of the latest weapon systems! The scenario is completed with DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) becoming a giant state within a state with import substitution passing for research and indigenisation of components masquerading as development. Illiterate durbaris in Delhi and many motivated Western commentators have expressed alarm at any hint of India’s review of its nuclear policy.

They forget that pre-emption, when an attack is imminent, is an integral part of any ‘no-first use’ policy. The new government can take its time in drawing up a comprehensive review of security policies. This should follow in three steps.

* Short-term (five years) and long term (20 years) comprehensive reviews of threats to India's security.
* Best mix of nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional forces to deal with them – both in terms of forces and equipment.
* Reform and renewal of the forces and production of weapons at most economical cost within the country.

Since the credibility of the threat of retaliation is a vital ingredient of deterrence (minimum or otherwise), the election of a strong-willed leader like Narendra Modi has already enhanced the credibility of our deterrence. It’s like adding 10 missiles to our arsenal. It is understood that military forces exist to achieve foreign policy goals (guns are the last argument of kings), including security.

In the Nehruvian era, he brilliantly turned it the other way round and used foreign policy to achieve strategic goals. But the 1962 debacle brought home the dangers of this approach. Such is the intellectual laziness of our foreign policy elite that any reference to building strength is ‘denounced’ routinely as an overly ‘muscular’ or provocative approach!

Should one then rather have anaemic policies? The ‘Ai mere watan ke logo’ lament on defeat needs to be banished to the dustbin of history. When next the army asks for new toys, the defence minister must ask some hard questions. Every time I have visited J&K (and that is several score times in the last few years) I am struck by the vast parks of vehicles and equipment parked in the open – and never used even once since 1971, or thousands of T-72 tanks, now being pensioned off and replaced by T-90s, that have never seen a shot fired.

A deep review of the existing defence posture is long overdue. It should be a ‘comprehensive’ exercise and not a truncated one like the Gen Rao committee (teeth-to-tail ratio), the Arun Singh expenditure committee or the Kargil review. These were truncated exercises and episodic and their recommendations were not implemented any way. A total revamp of security will not only yield savings worth 1 percent of GDP but also provide better security. Samuel Huntington (“The Clash of Civilisations”) had mentioned that India was the only country that seemed immune to American cultural power.

He mentioned that Bollywood outpaces Hollywood in the number of movies produced. The influence of Bollywood is all-pervasive in Asia. A fillip to dubbing, etc, will make it even more so. Giving industry status and making finance available will be of help. But even more importantly it is necessary to break the nexus between the underworld and the distribution of cultural products.

Buddhism is India’s greatest cultural export to the world. In the whole of South East Asia, there exists a vast reservoir of Indian cultural capital. To tap it and make India the favourite destination of the world’s Buddhists is not rocket science. If only the Bihar CM, instead of demanding a central package, had spruced up Bodh Gaya, he would be rolling in tourist dollars. All the three measures suggested are doable in the short term and will put India firmly on the path of economic recovery.

This would also silence the doubters about where Modi will find the resources for growth and jobs.

(The author is Coordinator of Inpad, a Pune-based thinktank)

No Show: Northeast women's Tryst With Politics

By Ninglun Hanghal

The seven states of northeast India present a truly contrasting picture when it comes to its women. On the one hand the region is home to all-powerful women's groups like the Meira Paibis of Manipur, the Naga Mothers Association and the Mizo Women's Federation, which have effectively tackled issues like alcoholism, gender rights and conflict. Moreover, women's participation in the life of the community is not just visible but is in fact one of the most distinctive features of the region. Yet, when it comes to their participation in mainstream politics, very few find a place in the government.

The Northeast collectively sends 24 members to the 545-member Lok Sabha, while the 250 member-strong Rajya Sabha has 13 members from the region. How many women figure in this list? At last count, one member from Meghalaya and two from Assam in the Lower House and one member each from Meghalaya, Tripura and Assam in the Upper House.

Their numbers in the state legislative assemblies are equally dismal, if not worse. Sample this: Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya and Nagaland have no women in the state assembly. Of the 60-member assembly in Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, the former has two female legislators, while the latter has three. Given the size of the state and the higher number of constituencies, Assam has 14 women MLAs among 126 elected representatives.

Clearly, women standing for elections and making their presence felt in the corridors of power, be it at the state or national levels, face tough resistance. So the question that arises is: what is it that is fuelling this regressive trend? "Blame it on deep-rooted patriarchy," says Tiplut Nongbri, Professor at the Centre for Study of Social System at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Delhi. "Like elsewhere in India strong traditional practices in northeastern societies, too, hold women back from exploring their potential in new spheres," she observes.

Nongbri, who has done extensive work on gender, family and identity in the Northeast, cites the case of the Khasi society in Meghalaya to prove her point. She elaborates, "Earlier, women were not allowed to enter the customary 'durbars' in villages and this continues to this day. That women are being kept away from fighting elections is therefore not a surprise."

According to her, the socialisation process under patriarchy is so internalised that women can't seem to "find the courage to come out and stand for elections as it will be perceived as challenging the system and being disloyal to traditional practices".

But if women are being kept away from political participation on the pretext of social convention, how does this explain the pioneering work done by various women-led rights groups present in all the seven states? Shreema Ningombam, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Nambol College in Manipur, points out that the focus of women's organisations such as the Meira Paibis is mainly on issues like conflict and militarisation and their impact on the lives of the locals, including women. "Their energy and resources are all trained towards protesting against the consequences emanating from this situation, which affects their lives collectively," feels Ningombam.

There is validity to Ningombam's observations. If one takes a look at the trajectory of the Meira Paibis, they initially came together for the 'nisha bandh' (anti-alcoholism) movement, and then later evolved into a more political outfit that launched a consolidated fight against the continued enforcement of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). "This women group is very political," comments Ningombam, "and if you go deeper then it becomes fairly evident that their leaders do take a clear stand when it comes to self-determination."

Yet, argues Papori Bora, Professor, Centre for Women's Studies, JNU, what holds them from becoming overtly political is the fact that "in the context of nationalism, there is a general understanding that there is no reason for women to have a separate identity. This concept strengthens patriarchy and discourages women from joining politics". Adds Bora, "The attitude adopted is - why do women need to have a separate political agenda? In fact, for women too their identity as an Assamese or Naga or Mizo is more important; the fact that they are a minority in the legislature becomes secondary."

The good news, however, is that in the Northeast women are as much at the forefront of exercising their franchise as the men. And in the last few years some of them have stood for elections as well.

First, a look at the number of women who cast their votes at the state level: in the Mizoram state elections held in February 2014, more women (3,49,506) than men turned up at the polling booths. It was similar in Arunachal Pradesh in 2009. In Nagaland, where the total of female voters is pegged at 5,38,968, 91 per cent voted in the 2013 election.

In terms of leadership representation, two women candidates out of 188 stood for elections for the 60 seat Nagaland assembly in 2013. The number was a little higher in Tripura that saw 15 women out of 249 contesting the last Assembly election in early 2013. The same year Meghalaya had 25 women candidates out of 345 in the fray, while the 2009 election in Arunachal saw nine women contesting and two women emerging victorious.

"These are indeed positive developments," remarks Joy Pachuau, Associate Professor at the Centre for Historical Studies in JNU, "today, while many women are being elected to panchayat, at least a start has been made with women contesting assembly polls. It will take time though. Traditions make it difficult for women to take to public life. The stronghold of the Church as well as other religious bodies also has an impact."

The role that northeastern women play in the democratic process cannot be overlooked. In fact, it is their overwhelming participation at the local self government level that is strengthening the basic foundations of democracy in the region today. Moreover, they never shy away from fulfilling their duty as responsible voters. Yet, notably, their contribution is still limited to the lowest levels of power. While many scholars and experts are of the opinion that it is not the numbers that matter but the quality of involvement, it is also important to make sure that there is equal participation.

General Election 2014, however, may not see much of a change although major parties are talking about women's empowerment. For instance, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi has included it in their election agenda, while recently BJP prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi focused his Women's Day Chai pe Charcha discussion on this issue inviting northeast women to share their insights. But despite this, parties have failed to field women in adequate numbers. The Congress has fielded two female candidates in Assam and one in Tripura, the Trinamool Congress has one woman candidate from Manipur and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has not given a ticket to any woman in the region. New entrant, Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), had approached AFSPA activist Irom Sharmila to stand on its ticket from Manipur but she has turned them down. Change, going by these trends, is still a distant prospect.

Changing Colours of Racism

By Vikram Kapur

CELEBRATING DIVERSITY: The kind of racism that has recently been seen in Delhi is not about caste or colour. It is about looking different. Photo: K. Murali Kumar

The brutal attacks get all the headlines. But the impact of racism on ordinary lives is far more subtle and insidious

Chinky. Dhandewaali. (whore) Momo. These are the kind of slurs she hears every day in Delhi. Some days, a local goon would ask with a lascivious smile: “Rate kya hai?(What is the rate?)” When that happens, she simply looks away and hurries past. On reaching home at night, she thanks her lucky stars that she has got through another day with body and limb intact. Before going out the next morning, she mutters a prayer, apprehending what the city might have in store for her. Racial slurs, she has learnt to handle. When she first arrived there from her home in Manipur, they would reduce her to tears. But with time she has learnt to put up with them, as she has with the city’s heat and chaos. She realises that the big, bad city is capable of throwing far more than hateful words at her.

I contemplate her with a mixture of guilt and bemusement. She works as a barista in my neighbourhood Costa. Until the past month, she was like any other barista, greeting me with a ready smile the moment I walked in through the door, making cheerful small talk while taking my order, stopping by my table to ask if my coffee and pastry were fine as I was partaking of them. Since the brutal murder of Nido Tania, however, the smile looks strained and the cheerfulness has all but disappeared. Today, as the newspaper reports yet another case of a Manipuri girl being groped in Delhi, she looks pensive and withdrawn. It’s obvious that she can no longer summon even the semblance of a professional veneer to contain the churning inside.

Empathy

I want to tell her that I understand exactly how she feels. That what happened to Nido Tania brought back memories of a horrific night in Norwich in 2005 where I was beaten black and blue by racist goons. That for almost a week after that night, one side of my face was so swollen that it was practically impossible to chew. That there were times in that week where I was so scared that my face would never heal that I wished my assailants had killed me. That for months I avoided going out at night and when I did, I would freeze each time I heard someone behind me.

But I hesitate.

I have nothing to do with the racist attacks. Yet that cannot quell the embarrassment I feel because my race places me right in the middle of the racist mob. I am unsure of how anything I say might be taken. An attempt at sympathy could sound fake or trite. Condemnation may not go far enough. And who knows, if we ever had an honest conversation about race, I might end up becoming defensive about mine and make a bad situation worse. So I do nothing. When she answers ‘fine’ to my question of how she is doing, I merely smile and nod even though I know she is lying and accept my coffee and pastry with a terse ‘thank you’.

As I walk home later, it strikes me that this is exactly how my white friends would have felt in England in the days following my attack. As I would go round Norwich with a bandaged head and a bruised face, eyes would be averted. People would fall silent as I approached, like they did not know what to do with me. The exchange that ensued focussed on the inconsequential and was chock-full of the kind of silence that breaks out when people are not sure of what to do or say. And there was palpable relief all round when it was over.

Subtle discrimination

The brutal attacks get all the headlines. But the impact of racism on ordinary lives is far more subtle and insidious. Invariably, it redraws relations by placing people on the opposite sides of a divide. It instils feelings of fear and persecution among the people it targets, while creating guilt and embarrassment among many on the other side. Suddenly, the most effortless relationship becomes exhausting as a distance that is difficult to bridge opens up. There are issues that are off limits because they are too hot to touch, and the whole point of an interaction can devolve to avoiding anything unseemly. As a result, the distance between people widens. That is its inherent evil.

It is not as if we in India are new to racism. In the past, though, Indian racism was about caste and colour. Low-caste Hindus would accuse the upper castes of perpetuating a form of discrimination that amounted to racism. Then there was the gripe that dark-skinned Indians had with the nation’s fascination with light skin. The word black in most Indian languages was synonymous with ugly and it was understood that to be considered attractive you had to be fair.

Caste and colour divisions still exist in India. Just about every day an honour killing takes place, because a low-caste Hindu has dared to marry someone from an upper caste. The lust for light skin, too, is alive and well. A glance at the matrimonial pages of newspapers indicates just about every man or woman desires a light-skinned spouse. Skin-whitening creams and lotions fly off the shelves in bazaars and supermarkets, and most Bollywood movies feature actors light-skinned enough for India to resemble a South European country.

However, the kind of racism that has recently been seen in Delhi with Northeasterners or, for that matter, Africans, is of the kind that was formerly associated with the West. Caste and colour have nothing to do with it. Africans and the bulk of the Northeasterners are not Hindus. Furthermore, in terms of skin colour, most Northeasterners tend to be fairer than the average Indian. The fact that they are being targeted, along with the Africans, is for one reason only. They look different. It is no accident that if you see an Indian woman with an African man in Delhi, more often than not, she is a Northeasterner, the kind of Indian made to feel foreign in her own country.

In the past, India was always at the forefront of the battle against racism. Both Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela took inspiration from India and Mahatma Gandhi. In the United Nations and other world forums, India spoke for suppressed people wherever they were in the world. As one of the first non-white nations to throw off the yoke of European colonialism, India was a beacon of hope for freedom fighters everywhere. Yet when it comes to accepting people from other races in our own society, we are showing that we are light years away from practising what we have preached.

Racism has been the scourge of the Western world for generations. It is sad to see it spreading its tentacles in India.

(Vikram Kapur is a writer and an associate professor at Shiv Nadar University.)

First look North-East, then Look East

By Prasenjit Chowdhury

New Delhi, Mar 3 : The BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi cautioning China against repeatedly staking claim to Arunachal Pradesh and exhorting it to give up its “expansionist attitude” must serve the purpose, beyond just warming the cockles of our nationalist hearts, of giving us a foretaste of what, if Modi becomes prime minister, could be India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China.

But what became problematic was his proclamation in another rally in Silchar in south Assam, that Hindu migrants from Bangladesh must be accommodated in the country, while the others should be sent back.

In the first note, Modi is perfectly in accord with his ideological predecessor since as early as the 1950s, the Jana Sangh was worried about the growing influence of Peking (now Beijing) in Tibet.

In 1959 its working committee reacted to the Chinese incursions along the India-Tibet border by demanding from Jawaharlal Nehru’s government that the territories that had been occupied be ‘liberated’. When the first signs of the Chinese invasion appeared in May 1962 with the capture of two Indian frontier posts, the Jana Sangh called for massive reprisals and to cut off all diplomatic relations.

We are rightly irked over China making territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh. Apart from last year’s adventurousness, it is on record how in 2010 China stridently staked its claim to the state, and hectored us over Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit there and that of the Dalai Lama. Late last year, Modi took the UPA government to task for ‘failing’ to protect India’s borders with Pakistan and China in his first major speech since the BJP named him its PM candidate.

During his visit in 2011, Modi met the top government and CPC leadership in China and raised issues, among other things, related to the wrong depiction of certain areas of Arunachal Pradesh as parts of China and presence of China in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and the security implications thereof. Could we now expect a reversal of a logjam that started way back in 1963 when Pakistan ceded to China the Trans Karakoram Tract, comprising Shaksgam from Baltistan and Raskam from Gilgit, which is as good as forfeited to us?

It is curious to see how a nationalist government in India, should Modi become PM, meets the newly nationalist China, as the communist party having lost its hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse, popular nationalists now command a large following and exert tremendous pressure on those who decide China’s foreign policy.

Therefore, if Modi wants to put paid to China’s putative occupation of the Aksai Chin region of Kashmir, claimed by India, and Beijing’s claims on India’s far-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, the moot question would be if he would favour ‘shelving’ the ‘difficult’ border issue and improving ties in other areas, as China currently does, at least till India’s defence modernisation programme is complete — perhaps by the middle of this century — or would go for computing the logistics of going hawkish.

Inadvertently, Modi trod on a number of intricate and delicate issues that relate to India’s intractable border issues with China and Bangladesh, to the issues of mass migration. As seen in the instance of 2012, Assam is a virtual communal powder keg riddled as it is by an unresolved illegal immigrants problem and a vicious fight over land and political power among indigenous tribes and multiple ethnic groups.

It should not be unknown to the BJP leadership that the demographic reality is too complex in the North-East and the root of Assam’s problems lies in the unauthorised influx from Bangladesh which has dramatically changed the ethnic landscape of various districts of Assam closer to the international border, starting with Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Barpeta and even Nalbari.

Apart from talking tough, neither the Congress nor BJP governments have adopted a viable policy to stop the tide of illegal immigration. This gives one the impression that electoral politics and its lust for minority votes have been allowed to come into play in the region. It is essentially a battle of attrition over jobs and control over land among many stakeholders.

India’s Look East policy has both parties’ fingerprints on it. Modi’s real test would therefore be, should he get a call, to take up a North-East policy with no room for sectarianism.

Prasenjit Chowdhury is a Kolkata-based commentator