Assam Sinks Into Anarchy

A NEW FORMAT NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED IF BORDER DISPUTES IN THE region CAN NO LONGER BE RESOLVED BY OLD METHODS, SAYS PATRICIA MUKHIM


Any of the North-eastern states have been carved out of Assam, with which state Nagaland, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh have simmering border tensions. While Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh have been, and are at the receiving end of the Assam police in border skirmishes, the people of Nagaland along the borders of Merapani and Golaghat have defended their territory with a belligerence that is unprecedented. They are dismissive of the Assam police’s attempts to cramp their style. In fact, it is interesting to note that the Nagas have been able to inflict casualties on the neighbouring state on several occasions but the latest border flare-up has resulted in a huge toll for Assam.

The chief ministers of Assam and Nagaland, Tarun Gogoi and TR Zeliang,  were summoned to Delhi by the Union home ministry to discuss the matter. Union minister of state for home Kiren Rijiju has been told to sort things out between the two states. Now this is an interesting development. Gogoi is a senior Congress leader and was a Union cabinet minister at one time. That he should be summoned to the national capital and be told to speak to a junior minister could not have been music to his ears. Of late, Gogoi has been at the receiving end of public criticism after the inability of the state police to control mob violence, thereby leading to three unnecessary deaths.

Gogoi has not been on top of thing for some time now. Dissidence within the Congress and the government had gained ground and a leading cabinet minister, Himanta Biswa Sarma, resigned in protest after the parliamentary elections when the Congress did poorly. The party high command, however, does not have the grit for any change of leadership in Assam at this juncture, since Gogoi is an old faithful while his bete noire, Biswa Sarma, is a young Turk whom the high command has not learnt to trust.

In any case, the Congress at this juncture is too burdened by its own existential dilemma. It has neither the time nor the inclination to mess up with Congress chief ministers. But this is precisely the problem with Assam. Gogoi is no longer the most popular leader who has the confidence of the public. The election of seven BJP members of Parliament out of 14 was a verdict against the Congress and the Gogoi government and its litany of failings. Barring the voters of Kaliabor, who opted for Gogoi’s son, Gaurav, the large majority of people have no more patience for a government that has evidently failed to provide governance.

Like every other politician in the party, Gogoi, too, is promoting dynastic politics. Gaurav Gogoi, a foreign returned heir to the Assam throne, had contested the parliamentary elections and won the seat despite the general poor performance of the Congress. He is very active on social media and, following his Facebook posts, one can gather that he is not exactly popular among his peers. They are seeking accountability from the father-son duo. They are fed up with the alibis trotted out by the chief minister each time there are incidents of killing and communal violence in Assam. The border skirmish with Nagaland is just one of the many problems Taun Gogoi is facing and it seems like he is a tired man who is fire-fighting on several fronts without trusted lieutenants who can take flak for the government. Add to this the fact that Biswa Sarma could be using his clout to create problems for Gogoi on different fronts.

And while Assam is in a state of near anarchy with the government looking like a lame duck (not taking the blame for what has happened in the state but blaming the Modi government at the Centre for not stepping in with Central forces to control the recent rioting), the Congress is also looking at largescale dissidence in the next assembly elections, due in 2016. Just as the party high command is in denial about most things and has refused to take steps to address the reasons for its recent rout, Gogoi, too, lives in a state of denial about most things happening in Assam and the failure of his government machinery. When he appears on local television channels he is utterly dismissive about the rising tide of public anger against his government and says that other states also have similar problems so Assam does not fall into a special category as far as such problems are concerned. What he has failed to appreciate is that people elect a particular government because they expect it to deliver on a few key areas of their lives such as water and sanitation, safety and security, good communication networks to their villages, agricultural support, etc. These have evaded Assam in the three tenures of the Congress-ruled government and people want change — if only to see whether other parties can deliver. As for the border clashes between Assam and its neighbours, the problem can no longer be allowed to fester. In fact, proper research might throw up interesting evidence about the link between the claims for a greater Nagaland — the long standing demand of the NSCN(IM) and the belligerence of the Naga people settled along the Assam-Nagaland borders. Now that the Modi government has taken over at the Centre, most states want to draw his attention to their long standing grouses.

There is a tendency to push the border talks to chief secretary-level officials of the states in conflict. This has not proved to be too effective, going by the Assam-Meghalaya model that has remained intransigent. Other methods and strategies are needed at this point in time. There have been suggestions from experts in the Central government that disputed areas should be turned into special economic zones, health hubs or educational centres that would benefit people from both sides of the border. This suggestion has not received traction. Perhaps it is time for the Union ministry of home affairs to step in and come up with tangible action plans to avoid future inter-state boundary skirmishes that take a toll on human lives.

People living along the borders often suffer the most neglect since development evades them most of the time. If we look at the Assam-Meghalaya border for instance, people on both sides tend to gravitate towards the state that offers them more options in terms of communication, security and recognition. Meghalaya has not been able to develop roads to take governance to the last mile. The Assam government, on the other hand, has been quite active along the border. It’s a different matter that Assam has settled people of Nepali origin in the Langpih areas and they have taken up very aggressive posturing.

A new format needs to be developed and border disputes can no longer be resolved by old methods. There is need for a new line of thinking. I doubt, however, that the Gogoi government has the time and energy for that. It is fighting too many battles on several fronts and the aggression will only intensify with the onset of the next assembly elections.

THE WRITER IS EDITOR, THE SHILLONG TIMES, AND CAN BE
CONTACTED AT patricia17@rediffmail.com

How Assam-Nagaland Border Dispute Became A People Versus History Problem

By Simantik Dowerah

Shops, offices and educational institutions are open in Assam's Golaghat town as it limps back to normalcy after witnessing major clashes between civilians and police on 20 August resulting in the death of three people and many injured.

Ironically, the clashes happened during a protest against police excess. At the core of these clashes was the Assam-Nagaland border turmoil which got sidelined because the attention shifted to police violence rather than on the contentious border issue.

Today, 780 families of 16 villages at Sector 'B' at Uriamghat in Assam's Golaghat district, whose houses were burnt down by NSCN-KK cadres who illegally crossed over to Assam, lead an uncertain life at the ill-equipped relief camps. They stare at a bleak future as the state government provides no solid assurance to secure them, and their homes have already been destroyed. As of now, they do not have the courage to return to their homes because they fear being targeted by Naga insurgents.
In their latest wave of attack, 16 people lost their lives. This is not first time that Assam has lost its people to Naga miscreants. In two big attacks in January 1979 and in June 1985, Naga militants. allegedly with support from the Nagaland Police killed nearly 100 people in the Golaghat district including Assam Police personnel.

Shops get opened after curfew was relaxed from 6 am to 12 noon in tension-gripped Golaghat on Friday. PTI

Officially, Assam and Nagaland share a 434 km boundary after the latter was carved out as an independent state in 1963. However, Nagaland has been encroaching on vast swathes of land in the upper Assam districts of Sivasagar, Jorhat and Golaghat since then. Over 60,000 hectares of Assam forest land is under the occupation of Nagaland where schools, health centres, churches and other facilities have sprung up with the direct help of the Naga government. Violence is used a method to scare away the residents after which a methodical occupation begins. Helpless in front of the aggressive Nagas and owing to Nagaland's refusal to accept the constitutional boundary, Assam has also knocked on the doors of the Supreme Court but the verdict is still awaited.

"Both the Centre-appointed Sundaram Commission (1971) and the Shastri Commission (1985) had ruled in favour of Assam. But Nagaland rejected the recommendations of both these panels. For administrative convenience, the Britishers had way back in 1925 demarcated a boundary between Assam and Nagaland. But Nagaland started behaving aggressively after the state was formed in 1963. The first clash happened at Assam's Kakodoonga Reserve Forest in 1965," professor in Sociology, Tezpur University Chandan Kumar Sharma told Firstpost.

Different bodies in Nagaland often refer to history to fortify their claim on the land that officially belongs to Assam. But the reference to history is hotly contested.

"The Nagas are seeking a historical boundary but there is no evidence to prove it. The Ahom kings gave land to Nagas for agriculture but the ownership of the land always belonged to the state. During the Ahom rule, the Nagas were entrusted with the responsibility to look after peace in areas which were located further south of the Ahom capital. There is no documentation on the basis of which Nagaland can claim the land as theirs. The border in the days of Ahom rule was not a hard (fixed) one. It was converted into a hard one from soft by the Britishers (in 1925)," Sharma said.

In a memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court-appointed Local Commission on Assam-Nagaland border issue on 20 August 2007, the All Assam Students’ Union (Aasu) also came down heavily on the historical "distortion" of boundary the Nagas were carrying out. It said: "Every year the Naga chiefs with large revenue came down to the Ahom capital to pay tribute. It was then only the Nagas would enjoy products of the khats (land). Unless they came and paid tribute in kind to the Ahom kings, the Naga chiefs were not entitled to enjoy the khat and fishing lake. A refractory chief was not allowed to come down and thus he forfeited the products of the khats. According to the British records, there had been some 25 khats along the foot of the Naga Hills but within the Ahom kingdom.

"It is unfortunate that the Nagas have distorted this historical fact by explaining the khats as "taxes" paid by the Ahom kings, whereas the khats were landed estates, granted by Ahom kings to certain villages or clans of Naga in consideration of services. The khats were cultivated by a class of men called paik who were subjects of the Ahom kings. Even during the British period, the khats were treated as valid revenue grants and were still cultivated by tenants. However, these were managed by the Katakis. These katakis were employed by the British officials as intermediaries in their dealing with the Nagas. In the Ahom period, the Katakis were appointed by the Ahom king. During the British period, the Katakis were appointed by the British. All Katakis were Assamese, not Nagas."

Assam's border plight is not limited to Nagaland alone. Clashes are also common on the Assam-Meghalaya and Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border. On 29 January this year, armed groups from Arunachal Pradesh attacked Chauldhuwa village at Behali Reserve Forest village in Assam's Sonitpur district killing 10 people and injuring eight. Major clashes also occurred at the Assam-Meghalya border in January 2011. The state also shares its boundary with Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura.
Border conflicts that Assam has with most of its neighbours is due to the fact that all these new Indian states belonged to the erstwhile Assam Province. It was created by the British in 1911 after the partition of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Provinces. Shillong was the Assam capital before Meghalaya became a separate state. Assam was first separated from Bengal in 1874 as per the 'North-East Frontier' non-regulation province by the British. Then it became a part of Eastern Bengal in 1905 and became an independent province in 1911.

"Before these hard boundaries were set up to collect tax, the natural resources on the border areas were all common," Sharma said.

"The Britishers began tea plantation in a massive way by destroying vast forest areas. The tea gardens were prohibited areas and no trespassing was allowed. In fact, this was the first step that disconnected the Naga tribes living on the hills from the rest of the population on the plains as the tea gardens blocked most of the paths which were in use to transit between the hills and plains for generations," he said.

Not only had the tea gardens created a gap between the hills and plains but they also made the Nagas realise that by owning tea gardens they had the chance of becoming farm-based entrepreneurs. What the Nagas have been eyeing for decades are also profits from tea farming. Geographically speaking, Nagaland is cradled on the Naga Hills which are part of the Arakan range or Rahkine range. Due to the hilly terrain, farming has always been a challenge on the slopes. In this context, tea cultivation has also made the ongoing Assam-Nagaland border strife an economic one. In fact, many small and illegal tea gardens have already come up in the disputed region under Naga ownership.

Security personnel patrol in the streets of tension-gripped Golaghat town after curfew was extended till 6PM on Friday. PTI

"They are seeking land in the plains. Those who are seeking land in plains for farming are mostly the elite class in Nagaland. In fact, they are allegedly using illegal migrants from Bangladesh as cheap labourers to work in the tea gardens. The Nagas are also shifting their attention away from their traditional jhum cultivation," the professor said.

But this practice has come up with its own set of problems. Now the Bangladeshi population has gradually swelled in the area leading to confrontations between them and the Nagas regarding ownership of land. Add to that jobless workers of nearby tea gardens have also settled down in these places which are largely reserved forests.

"Many Assamese families who live in these reserved areas have lost their property in some other parts of the state due to recurrent erosion and floods. As the government has no rehabilitation policy for them, these people have to fend for themselves," Sharma said.

N Venuh, associate professor in the department of History and Archaeology, Nagaland University shared a different perception on the issue.

"The real people of Assam and Nagaland living in the region do not have any differences on the boundary. It is the increasing number of Bangladeshi migrants and Adivasi immigrants that is causing the problem. Earlier these Adivasis were tenants of the Nagas but now that they have started claiming the land as theirs. Some unscrupulous elements took advantage of the situation and made it an Assam-Nagaland border dispute," Venuh told Firstpost from Lumami in Nagaland's Zunheboto district.

He also blamed the Assam government for allegedly indulging in electoral politics.

"They want these people to settle there and take electoral benefits out of them. They actually want to protect these people at the expense of the original Assamese and Naga people who are the original inhabitants of the region. The real people are very clear about the boundary. The border dispute has been enforced upon us for political reasons. No one from Nagaland is encroaching. In 2007, a joint team of 27 civil organisations both from Assam and Nagaland had toured the entire region and found that there is no dispute on the ground," he said.

However, Sharma did not agree with Venuh that there is no encroachment from the Nagaland side. He pointed out that beyond the economic purview the expansionist mentality of the Nagas, particularly of its insurgents, has become a reason of great concern for Assam.

"The demand for a Greater Nagalim has only found favour from successive state governments in Nagaland. It is a fact that the NSCN cadres, no matter to which faction they belong to, roam freely with weapons and the Nagaland government conveniently looks away. Unofficially, it is quite apparent that the Nagaland government is behind this land gain mission. Unless Assam embarks upon strong policies to protect its borders from encroachments, this would continue unabated. There is also need to stop the appeasement policy towards Nagaland. It is still unbelievable that Assam gifted Dimapur to Nagaland whereas it rightfully belonged to the Dimasa tribe," Sharma said.

It is obvious that both the states are using the circumstances on the border as per their convenience.

"If the both the governments are sincere to resolve the dispute and if they take the real people into confidence the problem should be solved in the future," Venuh said.
But there is a catch. Who are the 'real people'?

Rethinking Impunity

By Bunker Roy

The Centre has not only shown a lack of will and courage to dispense with this act, but even blocked a debate on it.

Why it may be time to revoke the AFSPA in areas like Manipur.

Gandhi (1982), an epic but intimate biographical film, was Richard Attenborough's greatest triumph.
The release of Irom Sharmila from custody and her subsequent arrest have again raised the issue of whether the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act should remain in force in areas like Manipur. For some time, the chief minister of J&K has asserted that his state can do without the AFSPA. In Manipur, Sharmila has been on hunger strike for 14 years, demanding that this controversial and draconian law be repealed.

Neither the UPA nor the present government has paid any heed. What is so special about this law and why are all governments so reluctant to do away with it? It provides the authorities with a shortcut to assume certain repressive powers that are not normally available to them in a democratic society. It gives commissioned as well as non-commissioned officers of the armed forces special powers to deal with law and order situations in areas notified by the Central or state government as “disturbed”. These special powers include the right to use force, even to cause death; arrest without a warrant; destroy shelters, camps, structures, arms dumps; enter and search without a warrant. But neither the AFSPA nor any other law defines what constitutes a “disturbed” area.

The AFSPA, originally intended as a short-term measure, has remained in force for decades in states like Manipur. Despite tremendous public agitation in that state, the Centre has declined to repeal it, even though there is considerable evidence that it has led to gross violations of human rights. A number of committees, like the Jeevan Reddy Committee and the Santosh Hegde Committee, have clearly indicted the armed forces for gross violations of human rights and recommended the repeal of this exceedingly harsh law.

An argument often put forward by the government and army in support of the law is that the Supreme Court upheld its constitutional validity in the 1998 case, Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs Union of India. A law may be constitutionally valid, but that is no guarantee against misuse. The Pathribal fake encounter case of March 2000 and the alleged rape and murder of Thangjam Manorama Devi, a 34-year-old Manipuri woman, in 2004 by armed forces personnel are only two of the many examples of such misuse.

The army also asserts that the majority of complaints of human rights violations against its personnel are false. The problem with this type of argument is that most complaints are investigated and tried by the army itself. It has shown considerable reluctance to hand over such cases to the civil authorities or courts. It is only at the intervention of higher courts that the army has been forced to hand over some cases to outside investigating agencies like the CBI.

The AFSPA provides protection to armed forces personnel working under it, as no prosecution can be launched against them without sanction from the Centre. Civil rights activists have often complained that this gives them impunity. This argument is not very convincing because even if this provision is removed from the act, members of the armed forces will continue to be covered by Section 197 of the CrPC, which debars courts from taking cognisance of any offence alleged to have been committed by them without sanction from the Centre.

The Centre has not only shown a lack of will and courage to dispense with this act, but even blocked a debate on it by suppressing Justice Reddy’s report. Last year, the then Union finance minister, P. Chidambaram, even expressed the helplessness of his government to revoke the law because the army was against it. This is a country where the army is supposed to work under civilian control and decisions like imposing or revoking a particular law have to be taken by the government, not by the army. Chidambaram should have found a different argument to explain the Centre’s reluctance.

The army has been deployed to deal with serious law and order situations in this country on numerous occasions. In most instances, it has dealt with the problem without the protection of the AFSPA. It is therefore time the government showed willingness to objectively assess the need to retain this law. It may consider keeping it in operation in states affected by insurgency or terrorism, particularly when the trouble emanates from across the border. However, it may revoke the law in areas that are comparatively peaceful. If the government can think of controlling Maoist violence in some areas of the country without invoking the AFSPA, why can’t it do the same in areas like Manipur?

The writer is a retired director of the Bureau of Police Research and Development and author of ‘Policing in India — Some Unpleasant Essays’

Sedition, Devastation And The Birth Of A Nation

By Garga Chatterjee

In 1966, the Indian Air Force bombed Mizoram, including the present capital Aizawl.

The sanitised term 'collateral damage' was not in vogue then. When Mizos were being attacked with incendiary bombs that only an Air Force raised on Gandhian ideology could provide, many of those bombed must have had a lot of thoughts rushing through their heads.

I suspect that some thoughts were not exactly those of affection towards the Union of India. Legally, sedition involves incitement of disaffection towards the State.

It's possible that some Mizo parents incited their daughters and sons to become disaffected towards the powers that were aerially bombing their town and villages.

In doing so, they became serious criminals under the law of the Indian Union's land. MK Gandhi had famously proclaimed that affection couldn't be manufactured by law.

However, it's quite possible to get the grandchildren of the bombed people to turn out in smart saffron, white and green uniforms for August 15 festivities in Aizawl. Schoolchildren under the watch of armed personnel seem to be a favourite setting for affection photo-ops.

An anxious Nation-State uses black laws to curb anything that tries to puncture its mythology and glorious Creation story. This weapon is typically used to shut up those who try to adhere to the official Hindustani slogan 'Satyamev Jayate' (Truth alone prevails).

It isn't accidental that four lions stare down at anyone who takes the Satyamev pronouncement at face value. Lions hunt in packs. Too many undesirable people whose remains will never be found know this too well. That's the usual method of instant justice for sedition. It is only when a relatively powerful person breaks the silence that the lions appear unsure.

Kalvakuntla Kavitha, Telangana Rashtra Samithi member of Parliament, allegedly said, "Jammu & Kashmir and Telangana were both forcefully, and at the same time, annexed to the Indian Union.

When I say I feel strongly, it's because we were both separate countries, but were merged with the Indian Union after Independence.

In 1947, we were not a part of India." Her father is Telangana's Chief Minister. That, her MP status and the 1962 reading down of the sedition law will ensure no harm comes to her. No parliamentarian is naive, but even within cynical speeches, I would celebrate any opening provided to myth-busting.

Sedition is a law of the powerful against the powerless, of the coward against the brave. A humane State embraces people's will. A brutal State sends in the army.

People who expose origin myths and crimes of the government under whose jurisdiction they live are typically sedition targets. They disrupt the long lullaby of the non-violent and consensual creation and unification of Nation-states. To consider a Nation-State and its political mythology holy is a slur to the sacred ­— the kind that predates all man-written books, laws and constitutions.

The shrillness with which K Kavitha has been demonised shows the tense foundations of the India-making project.

And she hasn't even gone half the way down the path of parliamentarian GG Swell who showed bomb-covers in the Lok Sabha when patriotic tricoloured lions refused to own up to their aerial hunt in Mizoram. I propose a statue for GG Swell. Let's call it the statue of integrity.

The author is a commentator on politics and culture

‘India Needs To Push Connectivity Corridors with Myanmar’

New Delhi, Aug 15 : Key connectivity projects between India’s landlocked northeast and Myanmar, a crucial part of India’s Look East Policy, need to be completed on time to boost trade and partnership between India and the booming Southeast Asian region, especially with China stealing a march, experts said here Thursday.

Releasing a report titled “Transforming Connectivity Corridors Between India and Myanmar into Development Corridors”, officials and experts said that Myanmar, which shares an over 1,600 km border with four northeastern states, is a key part of the development of India’s northeast.

V.S. Seshadri, India’s former ambassador to Myanmar who formulated the report, said the timelines of the Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-modal projects need to be straightened out fast, especially with democracy striking firmer roots in Myanmar and its economy opening up. Both projects are officially set to be completed by 2016.

He pointed out that land border trade between India and Myanmar is much lower than between Myanmar and China. While formal land border trade between Moreh in Manipur and Tamu in Myanmar and Zokhawthar in Mizoram with Rhi in Myanmar amounts to around $35 million, the two-way trade between Muse in Myanmar and Jingao in China is over $2 billion.

The condition of roads on the Chinese side, in Yunnan province, is also much better with double-laned roads. “China has several 22-wheeled tractor trucks parked on its side of the border which it uses to transport goods to Myanmar that exports mainly agricultural goods like rice,” said Seshadri.

However, informal land border trade between India and Myanmar is thriving with people of both sides, including women, carrying headloads of goods across small river borders. This trade is said to be approximately worth Rs.35,000 million.

Another factor, said Seshadri, is that in Namphalong Market in Tamu in Myanmar, there are around 1,000 shops stocked with goods like toys, confectionery, blankets, agricultural produce. The market is bustling.

But there is no market on the Indian side in Moreh, Manipur. He said that “greater predictability and stability” was required to boost land border trade between the two countries.

The former envoy said there was a realization in Myanmar that its western sector, especially Rakhine state that borders India, needs rapid development and that Myanmar “would welcome India taking the initiative in boosting development”.

He also suggested that a broad gauge rail line that is supposed to be built in Imphal by 2018 could be extended to Moreh and then on to Kalay in Myanmar’s Sagaing division with international funding. “It will be a crucial link in connectivity,” he said.

There is a proposal to develop Moreh in Manipur into a major township, equipped with hospitals, educational institutes and banking facilities that would go a long way in boosting connectivity and trade, he said. An Integrated Check Post is set to come up at Moreh by the end of a year.

Besides, Special Economic Zones could be set up in Mizoram and Manipur bordering Myanmar to boost trade, the report by Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) suggests.

Minister of State for External Affairs and Development of the Northeastern Region V.K. Singh said in a statement that was read out that development of the northeast was “organically and intrinsically” linked with Southeast Asia and that Myanmar was “key to development of the Northeast”.

Sujata Mehta, Secretary (Economic Relations) in the external affairs ministry who read out the minister’s statement, expressed hope that the report would be of enduring value.

RIS chairperson and former foreign secretary Shyam Saran said Myanmar was the gateway to Southeast Asia and shares border with four northeast Indian states.

He suggested that with Myanmar opening up economically and moving towards a democratic framework, India should take prompt action to push through the connectivity projects to transform them into development corridors.

Waiting For The Governor

By Tungshang Ningreichon

Manipur Governor visiting Shirui village in Ukhrul

Our house in the village is like a train with a gap, like a bogey derailed. The gap is the living room that was never built and now it stands as the self styled mud room. The gap speaks of hope that one day the house will be completed. The hope has lasted for more than 15 years!

Our home is simple but aesthetically challenged. It reflects a lack of architectural input and resources. People often mistake it for the village primary school a few meters away, or sometimes for the pastor’s quarter, traditionally built in an ‘L’ shape with many rooms to accommodate guests.

Every time I come home there is new “technology” installed. My father loves to experiment with tools, electronics and machines, turning every room into a store room with wires running all over the house; plug points are dictated by his preference for sitting arrangement while typing. He is, by the way, the best typist I have ever known. When he first tried his hands on the computer, I thought the keyboard would break into pieces with the force he is used to, on old typewriters.

This time there were fancy lights installed in and around the house that took me by surprise when I went to use the washroom. I was not expecting tiny bright diodes to light up my night activity. These fascinating patch-like diodes were fixed on the wall, taped on each end like it was hurriedly done for temporary use. Yet again they reminded me how the genes of style and utility are so far away from each other with men in general, and especially my father, for most houses in Ukhrul have wires and plug points hanging messily over the wall or from one corner, speaking of men and designs.

Every house however has a number of interesting lamps, torch and light tools which are mostly made in China or Burma. For those who can afford it, the inverter is placed somewhere shabbily but owned like the most prized possession. The district, you see, has acute power shortage. These days the power supply is for an hour and a half during the day, and tactically from 10 pm onwards when the town is asleep so that mosquitoes, insects and animals can find their prey and their way home.

In Tamenglong, local organizations had to shut the electricity department to register their protest of the dancing truant lights. People of the district have found better use for the electric wires—they take it home. This is legally called “stealing” and is so rampant that the DC of the town had to convene a meeting to take stock of the situation. Why blame the people for making use of resources around them I say with a smirk.

One of the latest reasons cited for the shortage of electricity is the poor rainfall. By that logic, the God of rain is pleased with selective places in the State where people have been holy enough to receive rain and be lighted while the remaining can compensate with candlelight dinners!

I don’t know if any of the reasons we have been hearing past many years is justified anymore but, in the words of Apou, my “memory bank” does not have any data of ever experiencing 24 hours power supply ever since we lived in the village.

The last time people in Ukhrul had two days of uninterrupted power supply was when the Governor of the State was in town as the chief guest for Shirui Lily week. His visit was such a hit that the Facebook status of my town newsfeeders; Yoyo, Tennoson, Kahorpam and Khanthing, expressed “joy” like receiving rare grace that comes home like the uninvited guest.

The statuses seemed to say that the town is beaming with life and energy and also lack of direction; of not knowing what to do with the suddenness of being lighted!

The celebration however had to end the moment the Governor left. The set up, as I imagine it, is like the lineman was watching from a tower and as soon as he saw the dust and smog off the line of vehicles, he pulled the plug puffing a cigarette, much like how the curtains are drawn after a movie ends...ah, how dramatically he must have switched it off, and for the next two days the town was ‘powerless’. Perhaps the electricity department had to reclaim or make up for its generosity and the quota of the two days of lighting the Governor.

We wait for the Governor and his entourage to visit the town again or, even better, if Narendra Modi comes to see Shirui Lily and tour the villages in Ukhrul... yawn yawn...while my father and families acquire newer tools to light homes and the companies and dealers lick their fingers counting the profits!

**Tungshang Ningreichon is a happy mother from Langdang and writes occasionally for the love of stories, histories and memories.

Strategizing Political Demands of the Kukis in Northeastern India

By Nehginpao Kipgen


       














The leaders of the two Kuki armed groups — the United Peoples' Front (UPF) and the Kuki National Organization (KNO) — are again heading to New Delhi with the hope of materializing a political dialogue with representatives of the central government.

A meeting with officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is likely to take place within the next few days. The meeting will be the first high-level engagement between the two sides under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government.

The issue of holding political talk has been dragging on for years. The Indian Army and the Kuki armed groups have observed Suspension of Operations (SoO) since Aug. 1, 2005. A tripartite agreement, involving the UPF and KNO, the central government and the Manipur state government, was formally signed on Aug. 22, 2008. The current one-year-term ends on Aug. 22.

The SoO was possible after the Kuki armed groups accepted former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's appeal for resolving armed conflicts through dialogue. The Congress government agreed, in principle, to initiate political dialogue within the framework of the Indian constitution.

Last year, the Indian government made the assurance that political talk would begin immediately following the winter session of the national parliament. Mr. Shambhu Singh, Joint Secretary (North East), MHA, briefed representatives of the UPF and KNO on the modalities of holding dialogue. However, eight years have lapsed since the start of the SoO, but no political dialogue has materialized yet.

Because of the government's alleged indifferent attitude, the UPF had last year warned not to allow the inspection of its designated camps by government officials if no political dialogue began by Aug. 22. The group also threatened to boycott the Congress party in the 16th Lok Sabha election.

How is the situation of the armed groups and the political atmosphere in New Delhi different from the previous years? Is there any sight of solution to the Kukis political demand under the new administration?

In anticipation of political dialogue with the central government, the armed groups discussed among themselves with the hope of finding a common strategy. However, it appears that they have not been able to reach a consensus on presenting one single political demand.

The UPF and KNO, constituted by over 20 armed groups, have two different political objectives. The UPF demands an autonomous hill state, or a state within a state under Article 244-A of the Indian constitution. The KNO demands the creation of a separate Kuki state.

Another challenge to the solution of Kukis political demand is on the question of competing demands. The Nagas, who form another major ethnic group in Manipur state, also claim the same geographical areas in four hill districts. The National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM) claims Chandel, Senapati, Tamenglong and Ukhrul as their own territories in their quest for greater or southern Nagaland.

New Delhi has had several rounds of political dialogue with the Nagas, particularly the NSCN-IM. These competing demands of overlapping areas have given rise to severe insurgency problems for the past many years.

Knowing the potential consequences of political dialogue between the Kuki armed groups and the central government, the Manipur state government inserted a clause in the initial tripartite agreement, that is, the territorial integrity of Manipur cannot be disturbed.

In light of the recent creation of Telangana state out of Andhra Pradesh despite a strong opposition from the state government, many begin to think that it is not an impossible task to carve out a Kuki state from Manipur.

However, it is important to understand that the Kukis and the Nagas have to reach some sort of understanding, if not agreement, on the question of competing demands in overlapping territories.

Whatever the outcome it might be, it is important that the central government keeps its earlier promises and begin political dialogue with the Kuki armed groups. There has been enough frustration of extending SoO for the past eight years, without achieving any substantive result.

A leader of the UPF in a recent statement said, “There is no point keeping on extending the Suspension of Operation (SoO) every year without engaging in political dialogue...the cadres will get frustrated if this thing continues for longer.”

There is a general feeling among the people of Manipur, including the Kuki armed groups, that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance coalition government would take a pro-active approach to address insurgency problems through political means.

The demand for a Kuki state comprising all the Kuki inhabited areas of Manipur was first submitted to then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on March 24, 1960 by the Kuki National Assembly, a political body formed in 1946.

However, history would not do justice unless the present leaders of the Kuki armed groups formulate a practical strategy by setting aside personal and ideological differences.

Nehginpao Kipgen is a political scientist whose works have been widely published in five continents — Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe, and North America. He is the author of “Politics Of Ethnic Conflict In Manipur” published by SAGE from the United Kingdom.

A Conversation and ‘Burma’

By Tungshang Ningreichon

My friend Seth Shatsang is a dynamic young man in his early 30’s but looks older and pretends to belong to the ‘wise’ age generation. He is a student activist, an aggressive campaigner and sometimes comes across as a country bumpkin and a shrewd politician. He has an accent that he seems to have acquired while his scholarly time spent down the South of India so for “we” you would hear “ve”. But he is a good conversationalist and his charm lies in his ability to converse about politics in simple language, drawing examples and relevance from his day-to-day interactions with people from different walks of life. He is conversant about anything and everything under the sky of Ukhrul- Senapati-Kohima. He knows a bit about Bangalore too but he does not know too much about Delhi and that is one area I can boast to have over him.

Here, I am not interested to talk about his life, his bad romance and his failed love life. He will not want me to talk about such matters either. One rainy day he happened to come over to my place. Since he came without a vehicle or an umbrella he stayed on and the conversationalist that he is he went on tonramble over endless cups of black tea. His story about his trip to Somrah village in Burma fascinated me and I know I am killing half the fun of the story by attempting to write about it.

In the north of Ukhrul district the last village to mark the India- Burma border is Tusom, which has about 400 households. As you go further a Naga village in Burma called Somrah greets you. Somrah is also a sub-township with roughly 300 households. It is about 13Kms and a little more than an hour bike ride from Tusom village. The road to Somrah from Tusom is jeep-able, but monsoon will spell disaster. The people of Somrah are dominantly Christians but wave of Buddhism is subtlety felt and slowly children are joining monasteries.

As a child who spent considerable time in my mother’s native place, Chingai; a sub-divisional village that serves as a convergence point for many neighbouring villages including Tusom and Somrah, it is not new or strange to see travelers from Burma. They pass by Chingai to go to the district headquarter, Ukhrul for education, medical care and for basic things like clothes, kerosene, candle, salt and other daily requirements. They bring fowls, dogs and piglets in exchange for clothes or money. Interestingly both Rupee and Kyat are accepted in many of the border towns and villages. People from the two countries at the borders are not strangers to each other as they share similar if not the same culture as Naga people and trace their origin to common ancestors. The consciousness as natives of two separate nations is prominent when soldiers in uniform are seen patrolling along the border. The Burma side seemingly is more strictly manned and it requires creativity to cross the border.

As for Seth, he went to attend the youth festival; ‘Ho-Se Krenbu Twei’. Since he went on the invitation of the youth group at Somrah villages who had asked him to come and celebrate with them he did not require a permit to enter the village. In fact he and his friend enjoyed special immunity and received a royal treatment. According to Seth the popular “gifts” to carry from India are cigarettes (preferably Wills Flake), soap and salt. These are the entry tickets and can absolve you from army interference. If lucky it can also earn you an uninhibited tour of the local places. Truly, these items earned Seth some recognition and he got to pillion ride a motorcycle to few places he wanted to see. Motorcycle by the way happens to be the most popular mode of transport in villages on the Burma-side and only few can afford the same.

Seth had also carried few bars of soap. He had ensured that it was not too heavy for his ‘activist’ budget and he was lucky to have found ‘buy three get one free’ offer on, in one of the shops in Ukhrul town. He carefully separated the set lest it leaves signs and marks of the packet being tampered with, and got each bar wrapped nicely. The ‘inexpensive’ soap bar was a hit and those whom he gifted got to smell soap ‘made in India’ and those who did not get, atleast liked the idea of receiving one the next time round and enjoyed the whiff of it anyway. Seth had also carried sachets of table salt which he apparently must have collected from his travel or his visits to some restaurants. He generously gifted

some of these to the army officer posted at Somrah. It acted like magic and roused the curiosity of the officer and even days after he left, Seth got profuse messages of thanks from him. The officer either did not get the time to open the packet or was shy to ask what it contained. Later he got curious and wanted to know what was in the sachets. The message was relayed to Seth through the phone and the climax of Seth’s narration lies in his response. His message to the officer was that “it is special salt to be used for special occasions when special friends and guests come over to dine”. What a great gift! He is being invited to Somrah again and next time everything would be on the house.

I asked Seth how he communicated with the people there. He said many of them speak and understand Tangkhul or Nagamese. Some of the students who have the opportunity to study in places like Delhi and Bangalore can speak in English (Oh yes they go to these places for higher education). As for the elders whom he cannot communicate with, his friends interpreted for them. However, many a times communication was also without language but they could understand each other. ‘Without the use of words?’ I asked. ‘Yes, without words. So long as there is love and bonding people understand’, Seth stated beautifully.

Truly, communication has no barriers. It does not recognize borders and boundaries and our hearts must follow suit. And like Seth said, ‘so long there is love and bonding a connection is established’. No words!

**Tungshang Ningreichon is a happy mother from Langdang and writes occasionally for the love of stories, histories and memories.

Time To Say Cheers?

After 17 years of being a dry state, Mizoram is relaxing its curbs on alcohol. Ratnadip Choudhury explains how the booze ban was a bane in the Christian-dominated state

By Ratnadip Choudhury

Risky gamble Mizoram CM Lal Thanhawla (centre) is counting on the new liquor law to help him gain popularity in the state, Photo: UB Photos

James Pachuau, 23, takes out his Royal Enfield motorcycle every late afternoon and zips down the roads of Mizoram’s capital Aizawl, towards Lengpui on the outskirts, where the state has its lone airport. He parks his bike with several others lined up on the roadside. Hundreds of Mizo youth in their 20s and 30s are gathering in front of a group of shacks where Zu, Mizoram’s locally brewed liquor, is sold. Bootleggers hover around, making discreet deals for foreign liquor, sold at three times the MRP and often spurious. They earn in lakhs and it is anybody’s guess that they cannot be operating without taking Excise Department officials and policemen into confidence.

It’s an everyday affair in a state where alcohol has been banned for the past 17 years. And in this period, more than 1,700 people have been treated for alcoholism by the Department of Psychiatry of the Aizawl Civil Hospital. Worse, at least 70 people have died after consuming spurious liquor.
“The world is changing fast and Mizoram cannot be immune to change,” says James. “The booze ban has done no good. You can get any IMFL (Indian-Made Foreign Liquor) brand from the black market if you can pay for it. And if you can’t afford it, you can always go for the cheaper Zu. The problem is, you can’t be sure of the quality and many have died because of spurious liquor.”

Zu is often adulterated with methyl alcohol, which makes it toxic. Moreover, an investigation by the Department of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology at the Aizawl Civil Hospital found that a kind of yeast called BEDC, found in plenty in Myanmar and smuggled into Mizoram, is used in making spurious liquor that resembles IMFL.

“The locals usually brew the liquor in jungles and under unhygienic conditions since it is illegal,” says Lalringthanga, an engineering student from Mamit district.

However, all this could change in a few months. On 10 July, the Legislative Assembly passed the Mizoram Liquor Prohibition and Control (MLPC) Bill, which will replace the existing Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition (MLTP) Act, 1995. This move comes after nearly half-a-decade of debate in the state over the pros and cons of prohibition.

The new law, however, does not lift the ban on alcohol totally. “It is a modification of the earlier Act and incorporates a system of proper checks,” says Mizoram’s Excise and Narcotics Minister R Lalzirliana. “The previous Act did not yield the desired results and so it had to be modified.”
In effect since 1997, the MLTP Act was legislated after the Presbyterian Church, the largest denomination in Christian-dominated Mizoram, came out with an assessment in 1994 that 65 percent of the women in the state were losing their husbands to alcohol abuse. The powerful Church, whose followers account for nearly half of Mizoram’s population of 1 million, prevailed upon the government to get prohibition imposed in the state.

Even now, the Presbyterian Church and the Baptist Church are dead against any change in the 1995 law. “Total prohibition has been beneficial in ridding Mizo society of various social evils. The Church has played a pivotal role in creating awareness against alcoholism and has organised many special drives against it. It has also been involved in rehabilitation programmes. We are against any change in the 1995 Act as it would make people more prone to alcoholism. The state is already plagued by widespread drug abuse,” says Robert Halliday of the Mizoram Presbyterian Synod. “We have organised mass prayers against the lifting of prohibition and will continue to oppose any change in the law.”

But they failed to stop the Mizoram Assembly from passing the new law. Prominent civil society organisations stayed away from the protests called by the Church. Perhaps, this signals a slackening of the Church’s influence on the state’s politics and civil society. While civil society organisations in the state had once stood with the Church on the prohibition issue, there has been a significant change in their stance over the years. Now, most of them are in favour of allowing people in the state to have good-quality liquor at reasonable prices. They want the focus to shift from total prohibition to efforts at controlling alcohol abuse.

Misdirected? At least 70 people died in Mizoram due to spurious liquor during 17 years of prohibition

It seems the spurt in cases of alcoholism and drug abuse made the state government take a fresh look at whether total prohibition was serving the intended purpose. According to state health department records, the number of alcoholics who were treated in government hospitals in the period from 1988 to 1996 — i.e., before prohibition was enforced — was 482. Ironically, during 2002-11, when prohibition was in place, 1,686 alcoholics were being treated with serious ailments. Similarly, in the period 1992-96, before total prohibition was imposed, 282 cases of liver disorders related to alcohol consumption were reported from government hospitals. The situation did not improve after prohibition, with 520 such cases reported during 2007-11. It was clear from the figures that prohibition had failed to control alcohol abuse.

This led to the formation of a special study group with the help of the Department of Psychology of Mizoram University in January 2011. The group led by H Raltawna, a retired IAS officer, undertook an exhaustive study and submitted its report in January 2012, advocating a change in the 1995 Act.
“The state saw a rapid rise in addiction to narcotics in the 17 years of prohibition. At the same time, spurious alcohol has caused deaths and disease. The bootleggers ruled the roost. Liquor was smuggled in from Assam and Tripura and sold at exorbitant prices in Mizoram. With this new law, the government claims that the checks will be far better,” says Laldingliana Sailo, a retired Indian Information Service officer now based in Aizawl.

The government is now looking at framing rules under the new Act to control alcohol abuse even as manufacture and sale of liquor is permitted. It is also mulling over what penalties to impose on those who break the rules.

The history of prohibition in Mizoram dates back to the time when it was not a separate state; it was then known as the Lushai Hills district and was a part of Assam. It was declared a Union Territory in 1972 and turned into a full-fledged state in 1987 following a peace accord between the Centre and the Mizo National Front (MNF). In 1964, the Centre had offered to compensate the states for up to 50 percent of the excise revenue lost due to prohibition. In 1977, Mizoram was among the 14 states and Union Territories that became part of the All India Prohibition Council set up by the then Morarji Desai government.

According to Halliday, the Church wants a “pure society” and, therefore, has always considered prohibition to be non-negotiable. “The Presbyterian Church alone has over 6 lakh followers in Mizoram, and we do have the power to raise social consciousness on the issue,” he says. “But we don’t want to be party to the politics of prohibition in which the government has got trapped. The government needs to acknowledge that it has failed completely in implementing the 1995 Act, we would like to complement its efforts.”

Indeed, the Church has all along played a significant role in efforts to enforce the ban on alcohol. Civil society organisations, too, have been keeping a watch on alcoholism at the local level and raising awareness against it. They have also targeted drug abuse and helped to keep it under check to a certain extent.

“Yet, the fact remains that Mizoram is a hub of narcotics,” says Lalhmachhuana, president of Mizo Zirlai Pawl, the influential Mizo students’ association. “For decades, the Myanmar border has served as a transit route for international drug smuggling. Narcotics is smuggled into India through this route and now the Mizo youths are also falling prey to drug addiction. On the other side of the border in Myanmar, there are many warlords and insurgent groups that are involved in international narcotics smuggling. The Central government has never taken it seriously. We will soon need a separate narcotics law for our state. As for alcohol prohibition, you will find that many Excise Department officials and policemen, who are supposed to ensure its success, have themselves became alcoholics. Many of them have gone for rehab.”

Over the years, the failure of the government machinery to enforce prohibition has led to the emergence of vigilante groups that use highhanded methods to deal with alcoholics. But the influential Young Mizo Association (YMA), which has been at the forefront of long-drawn anti-alcohol campaigns, now wants a change in the law. “We have serious issues with both the 1995 law and the new one, and have already written to the government about it,” says YMA president Lalbiakzuala. “The older law could have been successful had the government been strict about implementing it. We are not sure of the new law. It will be an acid test for the government. But our mandate is clear. We will continue to act as a watchdog and our local units will try to keep a tight leash on tipplers. And the sale of spurious liquor has to be curbed.”

With the new law, the government expects that revenue will increase by around Rs 30 crore. It also feels that the move would give a big boost to vineyard cultivators in the state. A few years ago, when the government permitted wineries to operate in the Hnahlan and Champai areas, the wine brewed in the state found a ready market outside. In fact, grape orchards and winebrewing provided a means of sustainable livelihood to locals in these areas. Mizoram produces 21,000 tonnes of fine-quality grapes every year and the new law would allow the bulk of it to be used in breweries and bring in more revenue.

“But revenue is not the key issue,” says minister Lalzirliana. “We admit that spurious liquor has taken a toll and we want to control that. And in no way are we lifting the ban totally, we are only relaxing it with many riders.”

However, the main Opposition party in the state, the MNF, is firmly opposed to the idea of lifting prohibition. It has always taken a hard line on this issue and has stood with the Church. Chances are that if the new law fails, the MNF will be quick to use it for launching a big political attack against the Congress government led by Chief Minister Lal Thanhawla. On the other hand, if the law is seen to be effective in curbing spurious liquor and rampant alcoholism, Lal Thanhawla would be one step ahead of both the MNF and the Church.

Source: Tehelka

Dilemma Over Influx: Is ILP A Solution?

By Patricia Mukhim

The demand in some states of the northeast India for imposition of the inner line permit regime is a means to extend the period for freeloading, which the region has done enough of, writes Patricia Mukhim

Manipur is once again on the boil even as the demand for the Inner Line Permit gets more strident. Babloo Loitongbam, the noted Human Rights activist has in a fit of anger made disparaging remarks against the 60 MLAs of the Manipur Assembly for not doing enough to push this Bill. He and the local television channel now face the prospect of being served with a breach of privilege notice by the Manipur Assembly. The disconnect between the elected and the electors is out in the open. Election promises are in the habit of being forgotten as quickly as they were made, once legislators enter the Assembly.

Increasingly, we see that the agenda of the MLAs and the ruling government is at odds with what the public want. However, the point here is whether the  Eastern Bengal Frontier Regulation (EBFR) 1873 from which flows the contentious Inner Line Permit applied in the states of Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh is the instrument to stop unabated influx from other parts of the country and from neighbouring Bangladesh and to an extent Nepal.

The three states where the ILP is applied (strictly in some states and quite loosely in others) have shown very slow economic growth. Nagaland is facing a deficit in its budget and is now hoping that the Union government under Narendra Modi would bail it out. Mizoram Government is facing a similar revenue crunch and is contemplating lifting the ban on prohibition of liquor. Mizoram has been a dry state for 17 years but it is not as if people don't drink. There are watering holes galore where the local brew is sold. The Mizoram government says it could generate a revenue of roughly 30 crore from taxes on alcohol. While the church and other civil society groups are resisting this move of the government, the choices seem limited. A land-locked state with no mineral resources and very little cultivable land must be innovative in its approach. Yet Mizoram is economically stagnated. So too is Nagaland. Whatever resources come to these two states from the Central government are spent with very little accountability. Hence the roads of Nagaland, including the important ones such as the Dimapur-Kohima highway, are in a shabby condition.

There are very few public sector undertakings in all the three ILP-bound states. If at all Arunachal Pradesh has any hopes of revenue generation it is from executing hydropower projects. The state, we are told, is capable of generating of 50,000 MW of hydro electricity. It's a different matter that nothing has taken off thus far although a slew of MOUs were signed with private companies several years ago during Dorjee Khandu's chief ministership. Whether the generation of hydro electricity in an ecologically sensitive region would have disastrous impacts on downstream inhabitants has not been adequately assessed. And until such time as hydel power becomes Arunachal Pradesh's mainstay, this state too depends heavily on Central funding. Of course the Centre might look at things a bit differently now that Chinese claims over this state are getting further traction ~ what with railways being built close to the Indo-China border just kilometres away from Arunachal Pradesh.

The crux of the matter here is our own dilemma in understanding the kind of development we want and whether we are ready to pay the price for that development. Globalisation has its discontents as Joseph Stiglitz so cogently argued in his book, Globalisation and its discontents.  He looks at the market fundamentals and how they operate and analyses why the market can never substitute governments as the distributors of social and public goods. But the point to ask here is whether people are happy to distance themselves from what is happening in other parts of the world. Are people content with the slow pace of development in their respective states and are therefore happy to lead sheltered lives away from other marauding influences from the rest of India? People from the three abovementioned states are moving out to the rest of India to look for better livelihood opportunities. No one is stopping them. So how can this be a one-way traffic? But this argument is likely to be trashed by those who believe that the ILP is non pareil. They believe in checking the movement of individuals into their states while rebuffing similar attempts by others to stop them from entering another state. We cannot have different laws governing different states without creating schisms.  The north-eastern region of India finds itself unable to catch up with the pace of development in the rest of India not just because of its remoteness from the Centre but also because it consciously chooses to remain aloof and untouched. There are enough people around who make a living by creating a fear psychosis among the hoi-polloi and who make the masses believe that they must be protected from a host of so-called adverse influences. But those who peddle these arguments about the need for protectionist policies are themselves very socially and physically mobile and enjoy the best of both worlds.

These double standards are what irritate. If people want the best educational systems and look for that in other states of India, what does it say about the development indices in those states? The best educational facilities offered by the private sector in the best locales of India have a huge population of North-eastern students. How their parents can afford to pay the exorbitant fees is another matter. But think how much revenue can be generated by these states if they had similar educational institutions within the region. Now that would mean allowing the private sector not only to come in but also to sustain themselves through easy mobility and secure in the knowledge that their investment will pay off. Can any of the seven states guarantee that private initiative will not be crushed by extortion and intimidation? So how will they generate their revenues? It is doubtful if the state would be able to depend on the Centre for all times. A tightening of belts is the need of the hour. And instruments like the ILP will only push the states into a situation where they will implode under the weight of their debt burden.

Proposing all sorts of protectionist Acts goes counter to the principles of growth and development. In Meghalaya too, the ILP protagonists have raked up the issue yet again. We will be seeing a series of agitations on this issue now that the Khasi Students Union has split and a more virulent group has been formed recently to take on the government on the ILP. With constant agitations stalling economic activities in the region, can we blame anyone for our own skewed growth and the burgeoning unemployment in the region? These are issues that the people of the North-east usually love to push under the carpet for they don't make good populist rhetoric. However, the time for a reality

check is now here. The Modi government is unlikely to continue to pour in funds unlimited into meeting the revenue requirements in the region. Enterprise is what the government is talking about all the time. The North-east must brace itself for such enterprise. We have done enough freeloading! And ILP is only a means to extend the period for freeloading.

The writer is editor, The Shillong Times, and can be contacted at patricia17@rediffmail.com

Talking business With Rebels

How social and political conflict is affecting business and governance in Nagaland and surrounding areas

By Sudeep Chakravarti

You wish to tap petroleum? Natural gas? Check with the rebels or check out. In July, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), or NSCN (I-M), the largest rebel group in Nagaland and a large swathe of adjacent Manipur, nixed an exploration project in Nagaland.

The group’s civilian arm, the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim, through its ministry of mines and minerals wrote to Metropolitan Oil and Gas Pvt. Ltd, rejecting the firm’s prospecting licence. The permit was issued by the government of Nagaland. Work stopped. Three months earlier, the outfit had with a similar diktat disrupted oil exploration by Jubilant Energy NV in western Manipur.

This claim is based on operational heft as well as a pitch for a future Nagalim, or greater Nagaland that seeks to unite Naga homelands in contiguous areas of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

And, at an unlikely stretch in Myanmar. Several strands of history and politics, and ambition and suspicion are intertwined with a tense present and an uncertain future.

Matters will get more complicated. Metropolitan Oil is at the centre of a controversy in Nagaland. Documents circulated to policymakers and media (I have a set) question antecedents and credibility of the company’s promoters and accuse them of making false claims of expertise and solvency. Local media have speculated about the proximity of politicians of the Zeliang tribe to Metropolitan Oil.

The Zeliang Naga tribal region to Nagaland’s southwest is a key exploration area. NSCN (I-M)’s July censure is based on such allegations. There’s more to the stew than business deals. After all, competition ensures sniping. One company can theoretically be replaced by another. And politicians are proven to be industrious in demanding a mile of personal benefit where even an inch is illegal. It also goes beyond constitutionally mandated rights in Nagaland (which became a state in 1963) that permits the state primacy in mineral rights. The right extends to ownership of land by a particular tribe—individually and in community trust.

And, therefore, the extent of negotiable benefits that would accrue from mineral exploration. This provided activists of the Lotha Naga tribe the leverage to prevent exploration and extraction of oil by Oil and Natural Gas Corp. Ltd in the Wokha area of Nagaland. It’s a stunning reality that a rebel group in ceasefire with the government of India since 1997 runs a parallel administration—and a parallel economy—in its areas of operation.

This is also true of NSCN (I-M)’s bitter—and relatively weaker—rivals of the Khaplang faction, known as NSCN (K), which inked a ceasefire agreement in 2001. The chaplee, or finance ministries of both groups freely extract taxes from individuals—even politicians and bureaucrats—and businesses. In July, Nagaland-based newspapers carried an NSCN (K) announcement, that an “official with the following phone numbers has been appointed to oversee financial affairs pertaining to the Southern Zone—9862567272, 9436111777”. Reality is as twisted in Manipur.

The ceasefire agreements with Naga groups do not extend to Manipur, even though Naga homelands like that of the Tangkhul and Zeliangrong tribes, among others, are in present-day Manipur (the former kingdom was accorded statehood in 1972). This is on account of huge protests in non-tribal areas of Manipur.

Protesters perceived a ceasefire extended to all Naga regions as a stepping stone to Greater Nagaland, and disintegration of Manipur. Skirmishing between state and central government forces and the I-M faction isn’t rare. Recent news of reviving peace talks with Naga groups, in particular NSCN (I-M), has revived ambitions and deepened suspicions. I-M is piling on the pressure to retain territory and influence in a present and future Nagaland. However, on account of tribal equations, NSCN (I-M) is perceived as largely Tangkhul-led, a tribe with its homeland in Manipur. This creates speculation that the Tangkhul leadership will not be accepted in post-conflict Nagaland.

This theory leaves the Tangkhul rebel leadership to consolidate their hold in Manipur. That in turn does not go down well with non-Naga and non-tribal folk in Manipur—and the attendant bands of ethnicity-based rebel groups—who have for long seen NSCN (I-M) as aggressors. Divide and rule has traditionally been seen by the government of India—especially its intelligence apparatus—as a clever Chanakya-like ploy to tackle dissent and ethnic ambition. The lesson has over time been assiduously applied by regional satraps.

But maps and minds are now so divided that it is nearly impossible to govern. As to petroleum and natural gas, these will remain underground for a while yet.

Sudeep Chakravarti’s latest book is Clear-Hold-Build: Hard Lessons of Business and Human Rights in India. His previous books include Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country and Highway 39: Journeys through a Fractured Land.

There is no escaping racism in India

A strange mix of prejudice, ignorance and centuries-old discriminatory practices make communities stick to regional taboos

By Archisman Dinda

It is an ugly, inexorable truth that Indians are guilty of racism. Though providentially not all of them, but sadly far too many of them — who distressingly reveal such traits more often than one had thought.

Racism, prejudice and xenophobia are rampant in India. It is a strange mixture of prejudice, ignorance and centuries-old discriminatory practices, when communities kept to themselves based on regional taboos. India never misses an opportunity to publicise its rich diversity, but the truth is that Indians are parochial: A large segment of people feel secure to live in their little worlds and protect its borders from any ‘external influence’. Their likes and dislikes for individuals too often have a direct correlation with their attitude towards skin colour and physical features, where even Indian citizens have to bear the brunt of such racist attitude. It extends to cover their language, culture, food, clothes and behaviour. They stereotype each other mercilessly and there are jokes galore about their food, clothes and accents. Colour consciousness permeates the way North Indians treat South Indians.

Indians contemptuously categorise all South Indians as “Madrasis”. Their attitude to their own citizens from the Northeast is no less racist. There, more than colour, it is the Mongoloid physical features of people from that region that attract the ridicule and disdain of those who love to consider themselves as part of the “mainstream”. Casual racism is commonplace. People from the Northeast are derided as “bahadurs” (a common term for Nepalese male servants in India). People ask them whether they are Japanese, Chinese or Korean. For most Indians, the Northeast is another country only accidentally and peripherally Indian. There is total ignorance in most parts of India about the culture and indeed about anything Northeastern. It may be geographically at an arm’s length from the mainland; connected to it by just a narrow strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor. In terms of acceptance and integration, it may as well be another continent!

It is not just physical differences that make people from India’s Northeast stand out in a big city like the national capital of New Delhi. The fact that they hail from societies that are culturally more permissive than “mainstream” India highlights their “otherness” in the eyes of other Indians. A series of separatist insurgencies being waged by the indigenous people of the Northeast also exacerbates tensions.

As migration takes place, across state borders — with young people looking for better education and work opportunities — a kind of xenophobia begins, which sadly is not restricted to the North Indian heartland only. In Maharashtra, many poor, migrant labourers from Bihar are attacked, beaten up and threatened as they go about their daily grind, often working for a pittance. Last year, when two women of Chinese descent from Singapore were molested in Goa, the police delayed the registration of their complaint with the excuse that they thought the women were from the Northeast. Two years ago — triggered by an SMS hate campaign — many residents from Northeast were forced out of Karnataka and back to their home states fearing racist attacks. Only when the Rapid Action Force was deployed in Bangalore did the exodus stop. By then 30,000 people had already left the city.

Indians rarely perceive beauty in dark skin. In fact, most Indians look for pale-skinned brides for their sons. Bridal ads ask for “fair skinned” girls. So skin colour is important and you cannot be beautiful if you are not fair. There are very few countries, where skin whitening creams can do such roaring business, with such impunity. Yet, our celebrities have no compunction advertising the same.

However, racism outside the country elicits an altogether different response. When actor Shah Rukh Khan is frisked by American immigration authorities and detained for questioning, it is racial profiling at its worst and causes a diplomatic row. Four years ago, when Indian students were the targets of racist attacks in Australia, incensed and outraged protests were staged against Australians, both in India and abroad. Calls were made for diplomatic ostracism and proscribing of Australian universities.

As potential victims, Indians are very mindful of it. But as perpetrators, they are reluctant to accept it.

There is another side to Indians, though. The country has always been a haven for persecuted people all around its neighbourhood. India has given shelter to Jews, Parsis, Armenians, Chinese who ran away from the Revolution and Tibetans who fled the Chinese. These people kept their distinct, separate identities and yet they prospered and loved India. Indians in return provided them with physical and economic security to carry on with their lives. Psychologists would argue that an average Indian’s deep-seated inferiority is rooted in a past of subjugation — the colonial desolation of feeling like a second-class citizen in one’s own country. But a deeper resentment now emerges in the form of bipolar urbanism, where protection of self and the turf is paramount and always guarded against any invasion.

This new form of interstate urbanisation creates social tension, as it proposes a fear of cultural and ethnic contamination, giving rise to the fear of losing traditional customs that the society adheres to the core.

Unless, purity of the heart and intent is accepted as the dominant premise of Indian identity, enforcement of such stereotypes will continue as the society oscillates between modernity, tradition and barbarism.

Archisman Dinda is based in Kolkata, India.

China’s Second Coast: Implications for Northeast India

By Namrata Goswami

Northeast of India has been in the news recently with the coming to power of the new NDA government at the Centre. With the appointment of Gen (Retd) V. K. Singh, former Chief of Army Staff, and now a federal minister of Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER), the arresting signs are that India is serious about both development and security in this strategic region, bordering Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar. Tensions along the China-India border in Arunachal Pradesh compounded by China’s territorial claim, cross-border crime in the India-Bangladesh and Indo-Myanmar borders and the presence of non-state armed actors with bases across the international border vindicates the critical need to mainstream the Northeastern imagination. What is, however, interesting, and of strategic significance, besides China’s growing military presence in Tibet, is its activities in Myanmar especially with regard to ambitions for better access to the sea via the Myanmar coast. China has been assiduously building up its ‘second coast’ in Myanmar overlooking the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. While this build up has the undivided attention of India’s Navy and defense establishment, it would be vital to add the future implications for the Northeast, to make a holistic strategic and security assessment.

China in the Indian Ocean Region

A report by Future Directions International, Australia speculates that China’s overarching strategy for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) includes constructing military bases and support facilities on foreign soil in proximity to its trade and energy shipping sea lanes of communication (SLOC).1 These areas also called “String of Pearls” in the IOR originate from Hainan Island in the South China Sea, Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives, Gwadar in Pakistan, stretching to Kenya and Sudan in the horn of Africa. The strategy includes a canal through the Kra isthmus in Thailand bypassing the Malacca Strait. While these “Pearls” provide the logistics for trade in the SLOCs, it is the Chinese moves to militarily secure both the “pearls” and the SLOCs that have interesting side-effects: capabilities of monitoring Indian Naval activity and the potential to encircle India militarily in the IOR.2

Figure 1 - Overview of the Indian Ocean region

Source: Namrata Goswami

The ‘Second Coast’ and its implications for Northeast India

Myanmar’s 2,276 km long coastline in the Bay of Bengal has the potential to provide the ‘second coast’ to China to reach the Indian Ocean and achieve strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Especially transportation logistics to the ‘second coast’ from landlocked south west Chinese provinces like Yunnan have both economic and strategic benefits.
There have been reports of Chinese built SIGINT listening stations in the Andaman Sea at least at Manaung, Hainggyi, Zadetkyi and the Coco Islands in Myanmar. Chinese technicians and instructors have worked on radar installations in naval bases and facilities near Yangon, Moulmein and Mergui. The Indian Coast Guard has intercepted fishing trawlers flying Myanmar flags off the Andaman Islands. On inspection all the crew turned out to be Chinese nationals on expeditions with radio and depth sounding equipment for submarine usage. To what extent these activities and facilities support the Chinese military in monitoring the maritime region around the Andaman &Nicobar Tri command is not yet confirmed.3 Additional reports indicate that the Chinese maybe pushing Myanmar for a listening facility on Ramree Island, Rakhine state, which also holds the deep sea Kyaukpyu port developed for oil and gas transportation. China is building an integrated transport system linking the Kyaukpyu port to Yunnan Province in South West China with the sole aim of reducing energy shipping through the Malacca Strait and South China Sea. The plans include a railroad project from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, to Kyaukpyu to complete the logistics loop to the ‘second coast’. In 2010, Chinese warships on anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean made their first port call to Myanmar.4 China has discussed with President Thein Sein for the PLA Navy’s access to Myanmar’s territorial waters while patrolling the Indian Ocean specifically to provide naval escort and protection to its energy shipments and port facilities at Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal.

Figure 2 - The ‘Second Coast’ of China

Source: Namrata Goswami Further north from Kyaukpyu port is the capital Sittwe of Rakhine state where China has assisted the Myanmar Navy built a naval base. Interestingly, India’s northeast serving Kaladan River Multi modal transport system feeds off the Sittwe port being developed by India, being the closest to the Kolkata port. As per Indian Navy’s assessment, China’s control of Myanmar’s ports from Sittwe in the north to Cheduba, Bassein and a string of other military assets on the ‘second coast’ can enable it to enforce anti-access/area denial to deny the Indian Navy the ability to operate in its littoral waters in the Bay of Bengal. Such escalating scenarios have grave implications for Northeast India from clandestine arms shipments that pass through these waters for the insurgent groups in the region. Contraband arms shipments seized in the past from Chittagong port and Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh originated through arms traffickers in Cambodia and Thailand ports. The coastal border points between Bangladesh and Myanmar have become a haven for contraband arms transit due to inadequate patrolling of their huge coastline in the past by these two countries. These shipments can land on the coasts of South Bangladesh and Northwest Myanmar and then smuggled inland in smaller consignments into Northeast India. The neighboring transit state in Myanmar namely Rakhine has rampant ethnic strife and Chin state has ethnic insurgencies and is not fully controlled by the Myanmar government.
Contiguous to India and Myanmar in Southern Bangladesh several inactive Rohingya militant groups such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) are located out of the Cox’s Bazaar District of Bangladesh. The RSO has the support of terrorist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan including the Hizb-ul Mujahideen of Jammu and Kashmir. The larger Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) organized all the different Rohingya insurgents into one group with alleged links to Al Qaeda.5 Taliban instructed military training camps have been spotted across the coastal border in Northern Rakhine state, Myanmar. These organizations have the support of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and its allies, whose members have been convicted for crimes of arms trafficking for the ULFA and the NSCN (IM).6 Pakistan’s ISI has also been reportedly implicated in facilitating the shipment of contraband arms through the Bay of Bengal meant for northeast insurgent groups.

Figure 3 - The Northeast India Connections

Source: Namrata Goswami There have been reports circulating in the local press of Myanmar of China pressing its proxy militia aka United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers from North Myanmar to be deployed in strength along the new Kyaukpyu-Kunming pipeline for security. If such a scenario proves true on the ground, that would make any Indian security analyst sit up and take notice because of the UWSA’s infamous record of drug trafficking and contraband arms supplied to Northeast insurgents. Ironically, if China backed elements in Myanmar do get access to the Northeast’s borders, insurgent groups may have no further worries of elaborate transportation for purchased Chinese ordnance from Norinco and its illicit franchises in Wa state.
India needs to put in place a well-coordinated approach to secure the maritime and land neighborhood of the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. This would include strengthening naval and coastal patrol assets in the littoral waters off the Andaman and Nicobar islands as well as enhanced strategic assets at the Northeastern borders opposite the ‘second coast’.
India has to work with Bangladesh, which faces a huge national security threat as the landing zone of trafficked arms through the Bay of Bengal by conspiring foreign terrorist organizations operating from its soil with support of local elements. The Myanmar government is challenged by insurgent militias still running loose, who are aided and abetted externally for short sighted strategic gains inside the country. India needs to support Myanmar in establishing the firm rule of the laws of its government throughout its length and breadth. India would need earnest diplomatic efforts to push relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar in a mutually supportive security partnership against common foes of all the legitimate stakeholders in this strategic theatre.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

1. 1. Lindsay Hughes, “Examining the Sino-Indian Maritime Competition: Part 3-China Goes to Sea”, January 22, 2014 at http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1507-examin... (Accessed on May 05, 2014).
2. 2. Ibid
3. 3. Aung Zaw, “Full Steam Ahead”, The Irrawaddy, 17/5, August, 2009 at http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16448 (Accessed on May 16, 2014).
4. 4. Aung Zaw, “Is Burma China’s Satellite State? The Answer is Yes”, BurmaNet News, May 27, 2011 at http://www.burmanet.org/news/2011/05/27/irrawaddy-is-burma-chinas-satell... (Accessed on May 12, 2014).
5. 5. See WikiLeaks cable on ARNO at http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2002/10/02RANGOON1310.html (Accessed on May 19, 2014).
   
6. 6. Hiranmay Karlekar, “ The Great Chittagong Arms Haul and India”, The Pioneer, 

Source:  idsa.in